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An Examination o f Revisionist Theories in Criminal Insanity Jurisprudence 
Director; Tom H u f f " ~ ^ \
The criminal insanity defense is a controversial area in the criminal law. One case in 
particular that exemplifies its controversial nature is that of Andrea Yates, the Texas 
woman who in 2001 drowned her five children. Under the Texas test for criminal 
insanity, which asks whether or not the defendant “knew right from wrong.” a jury found 
Yates guilty o f first-degree murder. However, as it has been voiced in the media in the 
weeks after the verdict, many thoughtful people find this verdict wrong.
This paper examines alternative tests for criminal insanity to those that are currently 
found in the criminal law, including that o f Texas, in the hopes of finding a better test for 
determining criminal insanity. The alternative tests that are examined in this paper, are 
those of the philosophers Herbert Fingarette and Lawrie Reznek. Specifically, 
Fingarette’s and Reznek's tests are examined from the perspective o f five important 
issues that have occupied scholars in criminal insanity jurisprudence, as well some of the 
problems that have characteristically given rise to these issues. Finally, once Fingarette’s 
and Reznek’s tests for insanity are examined, they are applied to the case of Andrea 
Yates. According to Fingarette’s and Reznek’s tests, Yates should have been found not 
guilty by reason o f insanity.
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I. Introduction
The insanity defense in the Anglo-American criminal law system is unusually 
controversial, indeed so controversial that it is sometimes thought o f as presenting an 
intractable problem. ' A very recent example that illustrates the controversial character of 
the insanity defense comes from the trial of Andrea Yates, a case which has received 
widespread attention from the media since we first learned of her horrific actions. ^
On the Morning of June 20,2001 the public learned that Yates had systematically 
drowned her five children, ages 2-7, in a bathtub inside her home; and that afterwards 
she set four of the children in bed, neatly covered by a sheet, while leaving her last child 
dead in the bathtub. Yates then proceeded to calmly call both her husband and the police 
to report her actions. She told the police in detail of the events, including the oldest 
child’s attempts to escape her hold as she held him under the water until he took his last 
breath.’
On March 12,2002, nine months after the murders, a jury spent less than three hours 
determining that Andrea Yates was not legally insane, and therefore was guilty o f first 
degree murder.'^ The standard that Texas directed the Jury to use to determine Yates
' See generally, Abraham S. Goldstein, The Insanity D efense (N ew  Haven and London; Yale 
University Press. 1967) 3-8.
■ See generally. Bill Hewitt. “Life or Death?” People W eekly 4 March 2002, v57, i8, 82; Anne Belli 
Gesalman and Lynette Clem etson. “A Crazy System: As Yates' Family A ssessed Andrea's Life Sentence, 
a Nation Ponders Its Method o f  Coping With Madness." N ew sw eek 25 March 2002, 30; Timothy Roche, 
“The Devil and Andrea Yates,” Tim e 11 March 2002, vol. 159, 17.
’ Marianne Szegedy, “Mothers and Murder, " US N ew s &Wor1d Report 18 March 2002. 23.
Gesalman and Clem etson, 30.
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mental status, is a version of the “Right-Wrong” Test/ The Texas test, which is a 
simpler, and some might say cruder, version o f the 19̂ ’’ Century test called the 
M  ’Naghten Rule,^ simply asks whether or not the defendant knew right from wrong with 
respect to the criminal act in question/ Thus, according to the jury’s assessment of 
Yates’ actions, Yates was legally sane under Texas' “Right-Wrong” test.
However, as evidenced from the substantial backlash currently being voiced in the 
public arena,^ there is reason to doubt that the public thinks that this is the right test, and 
therefore the right verdict. For many, there is a profound sense that Yates was criminally 
insane, and thus should not be found guilty o f first degree murder.^ Perhaps part of what 
gives this strong impression, is her substantial history o f psychological illness that was 
documented and sometimes treated, prior to the horrific events on June 20*''. For 
instance, it was well known that Yates was plagued for many years by a variety o f very 
serious psychological m a la d ie s .T h e se  included severe post-partum depression that 
began with the birth of her first child, Noah, and reccurred after the birth o f her fourth 
child, Luke." When Luke was bom, Yates became “agitated and withdrawn, with 
extreme anxiety and sadness,” and then after four months, Yates tried to kill herself by 
taking 40-50 of her father’s antidepressants. Subsequently, Yates was diagnosed with
 ̂The “Right-Wrong” test refers to a kind o f  test which makes reference to the moral concepts o f  “right" 
and “wrong." It has its m odem  origins in the M'Naghten  Rule, which will be discussed in the Sec. II. B 
below.
 ̂See sec. II, B below.
 ̂Texas Penal Code, sec. 8.01 A ( 1994, amended).
 ̂Gesalman and Clem etson, 30; Jennifer S. Bard, “Unjust Rules for Insanity." The N ew  York Tim es 13 
March 2002, A 27 (N ), A25 (L), col. I (18 col. in).
" Ibid.
Hewitt, 82.
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“major depressive disorder” and was placed on the antidepressant Z o l o f t . O t h e r  
indications of the severity o f her psychological illnesses, were that she had “scratched 
several bald spots onto her scalp,” because o f tension and anxiety, and was plagued by 
hallucinations that “Satan was living in her and that she and Satan both must be 
punished.” '^ Moreover, in the two weeks prior to the drowning of her children, though 
suffering from depression and suicidal impulses, Yates was taken off the powerful anti­
psychotic drug Haldol.'"^ Two days after being taken off Haldol, Yates was found by her 
brother, Randy, to be in very bad condition. She barely spoke and seemed indifferent to 
everything. According to Randy, “she carried the baby around on her hip more like a 
football or a loaf o f bread ... not like she was a loving mother.” '̂
The Yates case is a perfect example of how controversial, and for some deeply 
troubling, the insanity defense can be. On the assumption that Yates did indeed “know 
right from wrong,” and thus was legally sane, many have argued that something must be 
wrong with the Texas test for criminal insanity.'^’ However, this controversy is not 
limited to Texas’ test for insanity, although perhaps it is particularly severe in this state.
" Ibid.
Ibid.
" Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
See generally the discussion o f  the M'Naghten  Rule in sec. II. B below. Specifically, see Bard. A l l  
(N ), A25 (L), col. 1 (1 8  col in); Gesalman and Clemetson, 30.
See sec. II. B below . The M'Naghten  test for criminal insanity is highly controversial. Thus. Texas' 
test, which can reasonably be construed as a narrower form o f  M'Naghten, would be particularly 
controversial according to legal scholars and theoreticians.
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Rather, the history o f the insanity defense is littered with controversial c a s e s . T h e  
Yates case is simply one o f the more recent, high profile cases in this longstanding 
controversy.
Although a variety o f explanations for our continuing dissatisfaction with the various 
versions of the insanity defense have been offered by legal scholars and philosophers 
such as the version used in the Yates case, there are five issues that arise most often in 
contemporary analyses o f the topic. These issues are:
( 1 ). The role that ""mental disease" should play in determining criminal insanity.
(2). The role that ""volition" should play in the insanity defense."”
(3). The role that ""rationality " should play in the insanity defense.^'
(4). Whether or not the defendant should have a legal understanding of the 
criminal act, as opposed to a moral understanding?^"
(5). Whether or not the defendant should have a noncognitive understanding of 
the criminal behavior, as well as a cognitive understanding?'^
In this paper, I will analyze two philosophers’ perspectives on criminal insanity, and 
their responses to these difficult issues, in hopes of ultimately finding better alternatives 
than those offered by the state o f Texas for determining criminal insanity. I will do this 
by first providing a fairly brief history of the insanity defense, attempting to explain some
Ralph Slovenko, Psychiatry and Criminal Culpability (N ew  York; John W iley and Sons. inc.. 1995)
1-14.
Goldstein, 45-96.
Robinson, 302-305; G oldstein, 67-79; Fingarette, 158-172.
■' Fingarette, 173-215; Michael Moore. Placing Blame (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997) 595-609; 
Lawrie Reznek, Eyil or 111: Justifying the Insanity D efense. 173-199.
Robinson, 294-300; Goldstein, 51-53; Fingarette. 142-157.
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of the problems that have characteristically given rise to the above five issues. This will 
be followed by an elucidation and explanation of the views o f Herbert Fingarette"^ and 
Lawrie Reznek/^ and finally, by an application of their views to the Yates case.
II. Historv O f The Criminal Insanity Defense
A. Vre-M'Na2hten History
The history of the criminal insanity defense can be naturally divided into two broad 
phases; Vxq-M 'Naghten and V o s i-M 'N a g h te n The Vvt-M'Naghten phase began in the 
year o f 1313 with a case involving the capacities o f an infant under the age o f seven."’
At that time, the criminal law was dominated by Biblical faith, and thus developed a 
religiously motivated insanity test that became known as the “Good-Evil” test.’® 
According to this view, persons who lack the necessary component for punishment, i.e., 
blameworthiness, ought to be thought o f and treated like children. Just as we understand 
children to have not yet developed the capacity to “do the right thing” in certain relevant 
circumstances, so too is this the case with the criminally insane. The capacity for 
behaving in accordance with the good will that the Bible teaches is what the Good-Evil 
test is designed to measure. The following passage gives a flavor o f the test: “ ...
■’ Robinson, 286-301; Goldstein, 49-50; Fingarette, 142-152.
See fn. 19.
See fn. 21.
M'Naghten  refers to the highly influential 1843 case involving Daniel M ’Naghten. a defendant who 
pleads not guilty by reason o f  insanity. This case is discussed in the next section.
Michael Perlin. The Jurisprudence o f  the Insanity D efense (Durham, North Carolina: Carolina 
Academ ic Press, 1994) 74-75.
Ibid., 75.
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sin[ning] against [their will] is restrained in children, in fools, and in the witless who do 
not have the reason whereby they can choose the good from the evil.”’^
For most o f the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Sixteenth Centuries, England employed the 
Good-Evil test or some variant/^ However, in 1724 with the case of Rex v. Arnold, this 
test for criminal insanity changed som ew hat/' At the trial o f a defendant who had shot 
and wounded a British Lord, the judge instructed the jury to determine the legal status of 
the act in accordance with the following proposition: " a mad man ... must be a man 
that is totally deprived o f this understanding and memory, and doth not know what he is 
doing, no more titan a brute, or a wild beast, such a one is never the object o f 
punishment.”^' This test became known as the “Wild Beast” test.^^ It seems to equate 
the actions o f criminally insane persons with a wild animal that lacks the right intellectual 
abilities to distinguish their violent actions from moral or legal wrongdoing. In this 
sense, the Wild Beast moves away from the Biblical concepts that are employed in the 
Good-Evil test, and adopts a more naturalistic understanding o f criminal insanity.
The third '?xe-M'Naghten test that developed, which is the most obvious precursor to 
the iamoMS M ’Naghten trial, is known as the "Right-Wrong” test. Developing from the 
Parker and Bellingham cases o f 1812,’̂'* the jury was instructed to determine whether the 
defendant “had sufficient understanding to distinguish good from evil, right from
Anthony Platt and Bernard L. Diamond, “The Origins o f  the ‘Right and W rong’ Test o f  Criminal 
Responsibility and Its Subsequent Developm ent in the United States: An Historical Survey," 54 Calif. L. 
Rev 1996, 1227.
Slovenko, 6-8; Perlin, 75.
" Rex v. Arnold, 16 How St. Tr. 695 (1724).
Ibid.
Slovenko, 8-9.
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wrong.”'*̂ This test, in turn, was expanded in the Regina v. Oxfor(f^ trial of 1840 to 
include other language which proves to be an additional influence on M ’Naghten. In 
Regina v. Oxford, Lord Denman further elaborates this criminal insanity determination: 
The jury must determine whether the defendant “from the effect of a diseased mind. ..was 
quite unaware of the nature, character, and consequences of the act he was committing." ’̂
B. M ’Naghten
The 1843 trial o f Daniel M ’Naghten marks the beginning of what can reasonably be 
called the first modem test for criminal insanity, and is therefore considered a pivotal 
event in criminal insanity jurisprudence. ’̂  After some 31 years o f using a version o f the 
Right-Wrong test, the English courts decided to alter the content o f the insanity defense 
to include a seemingly more specific set of criteria that allowed for a more accurate and 
thorough evaluation of the accused. The important details that give rise to the new 
determination o f criminal insanity come from two sources. The first is from the nature of 
the case itself. The second is from the reactions o f important members of the English 
society after the verdict was announced.^^^
Daniel M ’Naghten was accused o f murder after he shot a man whom he thought was 
responsible for trying to kill him. The victim in this case was Edward Drummund, who 
M ’Naghten mistakenly thought was the Prime Minister o f England, Robert Peel.
Platt & Diamond, 1237 cit. in G.D Coliinson, “A Treatise on the Law Concerning Idiots, Lunatics, 
and Other Persons Non Com pos Mentis," W. Reed 1812, 477, 6.36, 656-657.
Stephen R. Lewinstein, “The Historical Developm ent o f  Insanity as a Defense in Criminal Actions,"  
Part 1, 14 J. Journal o f  Forensic Science 1969, 275,279, qtd. in G.D Coliinson, 671. See fn. 34.
Regina v. Oxford, 9 Carr, and P. 525 (1840).
”  Ibid.
Slovenko, 9.
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M ’Naghten was under the illusion that there was a widespread plot to kill him by the 
Tories, and thus perceived his action as “self defense.’”*® It was then up to the courts to 
determine whether M ’Naghten acted on a delusion of self-defense, and what criteria 
should be employed in order to make this determination.
Ultimately, nine psychiatrists testified that M ’Naghten was criminally insane and 
should not be held responsible for his action."*' M ’Naghten was subsequently declared 
not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI), which had a large social impact on England as a 
whole, and specifically on Queen Victoria."*^ After hearing of the NGRI verdict, and 
upon great outrage that the courts could have come to such a decision. Queen Victoria 
proceeded to demand that the legislature “lay down the rule’’ in order to protect the 
public."*^
In response to such commands, the House o f Lords asked the Supreme Court of 
Judicature to answer a series o f questions.'*'* The answer to two of these questions 
essentially became what is known as the M ’Naghten Rule. The famous words of the test 
are as follows:
The jurors ought to be told in all cases that every man is presumed to be sane, and 
to possess a sufficient degree o f reason to be responsible for his crimes, until the 
contrary be proved to their satisfaction; and that to establish a defense on the 
ground o f insanity, it must be clearly proved that at the time of the committing of 
the act, the party accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease
Perlin, 78-84.
40 M 'N aghten’s Case, 10 Clark and Fin. 200 (1843).
Slovenko, 7.
Hermann & Sor, “Convicting or Confining? Alternative Directions in the Insanity Law Reform: 
Guilty But M entally III Versus N ew  Rules for Release o f  Insanity Acquitees,” B.Y.U. L. R e \ . 1983, 
4 4 9 ,508 , 510 qtd. in Benson, The Letters O f Queen Victoria. 1837-1861 1907, 587.
Ibid.
Perlin, 80.
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of the mind, as to not know the nature and quality o f the act he was doing; or, if  he 
did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong."*^
Though M ’Naghten was considered a fairer test for insanity than previous tests, a 
number o f criticisms were made o f the rule.'**’ These include, first, the interpretational 
issues associated with defining such key words as “wrong” or “know.” For example, it 
has traditionally been acknowledged, that “wrong” could be understood in a legal or 
moral sense, and likewise, that “know” could refer to a mere cognitive understanding, as 
opposed to emotional understanding."*’ Similarly, there are difficulties o f interpreting the 
meaning o f the term “disease.” One clear ambiguity that runs through the interpretation 
o f “disease” in M'Naghten concerns the distinction between the concept of disease as 
understood to obtain at the time o f  the criminal act, versus disease as understood as 
having a certain amount o f duration in the defendant’s life."*** In other words, are we to 
think of disease as something that is in some sense chronic, or rather as something that 
can be suddenl Similarly, questions arose as to the meaning o f the terms “nature and 
quality,”"*'* as in “know the nature and quality o f the act.” Does “nature and quality,” 
refer to the physical nature o f the act, or some other aspect o f the act? For instance, did 
the defendant know that when he stabbed the victim with a knife, that the victim might 
lose blood and eventually die? Or if  the defendant knew that, did he understand that the 
victim didn’t really want to die? There is a significant difference between knowing the
M 'N aghten’s Case, 10 Clark and Fin. 200  (1843). 
Slovenko, 21-22; Goldstein, 45-56.
Goldstein, 49-53.
Ibid., 47-49.
Ibid., 50-51.
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nature and quality o f an act from the perspective o f physical causation, versus knowing 
the nature and quality o f an act from a more first or third person moral point of view /°
A second set of difficulties are more logical in nature/' These difficulties concern the 
possibility that certain aspects of the test were conceptually mistaken, because they fail to 
embody the necessary and sufficient conditions for criminal insanity. It has been argued, 
for example, that whether or not such key phrases such as “wrong,” “know,” and 
“disease” are interpreted in a legal/moral, cognitive/noncognitive, or sudden/chronic 
sense, none of these concepts may be necessary or sufficient for determining criminal 
insanity.*’'  Thus, in a similar manner that having blond hair is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for being a bachelor, so too “knowing that the act was wrong” may be 
irrelevant for determining criminal insanity. This is because the meaning of “criminal 
insanity” as it is used for the purposes o f the criminal law, may have no necessary 
connection to the meanings that are given by the terms “wrong,” “know,” and/or 
“disease.” Thus, although these concepts may often be associated with criminal insanity, 
this association may prove to be coincidental, or at any rate, inadequate for determining 
criminal insanity. Examples o f this sort o f argument will be given later, in discussion of 
the analyses o f Fingarette and Reznek.
C. Irresistible Impulse
In direct response to these interpretational and logical difficulties, there was a general 
feeling amongst those both in and outside the criminal law that M ’Naghten was too
Ibid.
Fingarette, 173-175,149, 156; M oore, 600-601 ; R eznek ,]52-161.
Fingarette, pg. 149,156.
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restrictive and did not allow for a proper evaluation o f the accused/'^ As a result, the
courts began to consider additional concepts that might be relevant and useful in the
determination o f criminal insanity/^
The first o f these concepts, “Irresistible Impulse," marks the point in which the fourth
o f the principal issues of this paper, “volition," becomes historically relevant. The
“Irresistible Impulse Rule" was first successfully used in the 1886 case o f Parsons \\
State,^^ and was subsequently made the federal rule in the United States in Davis.^^ In
Parsons, the jury was instructed to determine whether or not the defendant exhibited a
radical loss o f control such that his free agency is destroyed;
Did he know right from wrong, as applied to the particular act in question? ... If he 
did have knowledge, he may nevertheless not be legally responsible if  the 
following conditions occur: ( 1 ) If, by reason of the duress o f such mental disease, 
he had so far lost the power to choose between the right and wrong, and to avoid 
doing the act in question, as that his free agency was at the time destroyed; (2) and 
if, at the same time, the alleged crime was so connected with such mental disease, 
in the relation o f cause and effect, as to have been the product of it solely.
While this particular framing o f the Irresistible Impulse Rule was considered 
somewhat narrow,^'^ later versions, particularly in the Model Penal Code, allowed for a 
broader interpretation than the one given in Parsons.^^^ In the Model Penal Code, it was
Fingarette, pg. 149, 156; Reznek, pgs. 200-204, 222; See, for instance, sec. Ill, A, 28-38, B, 56-59  
below .
Slovenko, 20; Goldstein, 46-47.
Slovenko, 22-31 ; Goldstein, 67.
Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577,2 So. 854 (1886).
D avis V. United States, 165 W .S. (1897).
Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 2 So. 854 (1886).
Robinson, 302.
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required that the agent “(lack) substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his 
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements o f law,” as opposed to “losing the 
power to choose between right and wrong.”'’' This particular way of stating the 
Irresistible Impulse Rule was considered less restrictive than was the one in Parsons due 
to the open language o f “substantial capacity. In this sense, the language of 
“substantial capacity” explicitly allowed for partial impairment o f a defendant’s 
volitional ability as opposed to total impairment, whereas with Parsons, the language of 
“losing the power to choose between right and wrong,” did not imply that the defendant’s 
volitional impairment could be partial.^^
Like M'Naghten, the Irresistible Impulse Rule was subject to interpretational and 
logical problems that allowed for inconsistent applications o f the test. Perhaps the most 
prominent example o f a difficulty in interpretation concerns an ambiguity that was made 
prominent in the case o f Snider v. Smith.^'* This difficulty is evident in the distinction 
between a sudden and gradual loss o f control.'’'’ This was a major complaint about the 
Irresistible Impulse Rule, and reveals why it was misleading to use the label of 
“Irresistible Impulse” to designate the phenomenon in question.'’'’ Irresistible Impulse 
was thought to imply a sudden loss o f control, a “fit o f rage,” or something similar. 
However, in light of what was thought to be an overly restrictive understanding of
“  Ibid.
ALL Model Penal Code. Proposed Official Draft. Sec. 4.01. 
Robinson. 302.
Ibid.
^  Snider v. Smith. 187 F. Supp. 299. 302 (E D. Va. 1960). 
Robinson. 302-303.
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volition by legal scholars, some urged a version of the Irresistible Impulse Rule that 
allowed for a gradual loss o f control.^^ One scholar even suggested that it would be more 
appropriate to put the Irresistible Impulse Rule under the heading of “Control Tests,” due 
to the fact that the loss o f control concept seems more neutral than does “Irresistible 
Impulse” with respect to the sudden/gradual distinction.^®
A second problem interpreting this rule, concerned the distinction between impaired 
resistance and overpowering urge.^‘̂ Although losing control is often thought of in the 
sense o f overpowering urges, frequently defendants simply did not have the ability to 
resist what would be, under normal circumstances, quite easy for persons to resist. Thus, 
how “loss o f control” is interpreted in the sense of impaired resistance and/or an 
overpowering urge, can have a great effect on the determination of insanity. Particularly 
this is the case when looking at which kind o f medical condition might be responsible for 
the loss o f control. As Paul Robinson has argued; “An obsessive compulsive disorder, 
resulting in uncontrollable ‘recurrent, persistent ideas, thoughts, images, or impulses,' is 
an example o f a disorder that produces an urge. But few others are so clearly capable of 
producing ‘urges’.” ®̂
Another kind of criticism, concerns the empirical difficulty o f determining when 
someone loses control.^' This is evident when a court tries to determine what would
“  Ibid.
Goldstein. 70-78; Robinson. 302-303.
Goldstein, 70-78.
^  Robinson. 302-303; Slovenko. 25.
™ Robinson, 303.
Slovenko, 25; G oldstein. 77; Reznek, 161.
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distinguish the woman who lost control and stabbed her husband, from the woman who 
stabbed her husband out o f anger? The sorts o f observations that are required in making 
this distinction are difficult to specify, and it is a legitimate criticism of a conception of 
the insanity defense, that, if it can’t give a clear and specific empirical account o f one of 
its main concepts, then the conception will be useless to a jury/"
D. Durham
The third historically significant development o f modem day, criminal insanity 
jurisprudence which can be seen as an attempt to provide a better alternative to 
M ’Naghten, stems from the famous 1954 case o f Durham v. United S ta te s^  In this 
case, Monte Durham, a person with a substantial history o f psychological illness and 
criminal activity, came before U.S. Court o f Appeals for the District o f Columbia, after 
having been found guilty o f housebreaking in a District Court. In the appeal, it was urged 
by the Durham  defense that the M  'Naghten and Irresistible Impulse Rules were 
inadequate for determining criminal responsibility. Judge David Bazelon, writing for the 
District o f Columbia Court o f Appeals, agreed. As a result, the test for criminal insanity 
in the D.C. Circuit was altered so that it read, “a person is criminally insane if they suffer 
from mental disease or delect.”^̂  With this new test for criminal insanity, a jury, on 
remand to the District Court, found Monte Durham NGBI.
The Durham Rule was certainly not without precursors, the most obvious of which 
was the disease component oiM 'Naghten, which said that the “the party must be laboring
See, for instance, Reznek, 75-90.
Durham v. US, 94 US App DC 228, 214 F2d 862, 45 ALR 2d 1430 (1954).
74 Ibid.
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under a defect of reason from disease o f the mind.”^̂  A second precursor to Durham
comes from the 1953 report o f British Royal Commission on Capitol Punishment.^*^ The
report, which considered the status o f both M ’Naghten and the Irresistible Impulse Rule
and was heavily influenced by a large number o f medical and legal scholars, asserts that
the scholars were “in virtual agreem ent... that the mind functions as an integrated whole
and that it is impossible to isolate the separate functions o f cognition and control.
Similarly, Bazelon said, in Durham, the following about validity o f M ’Naghten and the
Irresistible Impulse Rule:
We find that as an exclusive criterion the right-wrong test is inadequate in that (a) 
it does not take sufficient account o f psychic realities and scientific knowledge, and 
(b) it is based upon one symptom and so cannot validly be applied in all 
circumstances. We find that the “irresistible impulse” test is also inadequate in that 
it gives no recognition to mental illness characterized by brooding and reflection 
and so relegates acts caused by such illness to the application of the inadequate 
right-wrong test. We conclude that a broader test should be adopted.
An additional problem with D u r h a m concerned its failure to give empirical content 
to the key theoretical tools employed, viz., “mental disease" and “defect." The only clear 
meaning that was given to these terms concerned the difference between disease and 
defect, where it was said that diseases have the capability o f getting better, whereas
75 M ’Naghten’s Case, îO Clark and Fin. 200 (1843).
G oldstein, 80.82.
Quoted in Goldstein, 80. as interpreted from Report o f  Royal Commission on Capitol Punishment.
Durham v. U S, 94 US App DC 228. 214 F2d 862, 45 ALR 2d 1430 (1954).
 ̂’ Recall that these problems stemming from M'Naghten  concerned, on the one hand, an interpretation 
o f  mental disease that required that it be a chronic  condition in the actor's life, versus an interpretation 
which allow ed for mental disease to obtain suddenly  in his or her life. On the other hand, mental disease 
was criticized on the logical basis that it sim ply is not a part o f  the legal meaning o f criminal insanit)'. 
Thus, whether an actor does or does not have a mental disease may be irrelevant to the determination o f  
criminal insanity.
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defects are permanent.^® This, however, was considered far from sufficient empirical 
content to inform juries.®'
The most significant attempt to try to remedy these problems came in MacDonald v. 
United States, where the court focused on “impairment o f mental or emotional 
processes and behavioral controls,” instead of those processes being the product o f a 
mental disease and defect.®^ By almost all accounts, however, the MacDonald attempt 
was unsuccessful due, either to the vagueness o f the terms of “mental impairment” and 
“control,”®"'or to the practical difficulties associated with implementing the MacDonald 
conception in the courtroom.®^
There are other important criticisms o f the Durham notion of mental disease that are 
particularly relevant to the role it should occupy in contemporary insanity jurisprudence. 
The first concerns the general claim that mental disease is a social concept and not a 
medical one, which has the result that testifying psychologists use a different language 
and different concepts than required by the law.®  ̂ In other words, when psychologists are 
asked to testify on behalf o f the defendant as to whether or not he or she has a mental 
disease, the psychologist may be using a notion o f mental disease that derives from the 
discipline o f psychology, and not from the law.
David Bazelon, Questioning Authority (N ew  York: Alfred A. K noff Inc., 1966) 46-48. 
Fingarette. 128.
S2 M cDonald v. United States, 312 F2d 847 ( 1962).
Bazelon. 50, 63.
S4 Fingarette, 34.
Bazelon, 49. Judge Bazelon argued that the two central difficulties with Durham  concern, first, the 
fact that “psychologists did not live up to their promise to share all the information they knew." and second, 
that the participants in the court incorrectly tended to view  the terms “mental disease" and "defect" in a 
technical scientific sense.
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Durham  was also criticized for making psychologists ethical experts.^^ To the extent 
that the law under Durham requires psychologists to make judgments about moral 
responsibility based on the simple formula o f Durham, it was argued that the law was 
choosing a class o f persons to make a decision concerning something in which they have 
no special e x pe r t i s e . Th i s  is because psychologists are no better than anyone else at 
making judgments about moral responsibility, or so the criticism runs.®‘̂ In this sense, the 
court’s decision to make psychologists the ethical experts would be arbitrary.
Finally, some argued that mental disease is neither necessary nor sufficient for the 
negation of moral responsibility.*^® Examples that seem to provide some evidence of this, 
are depression and anxiety. In depression and anxiety, it is often the case that individuals 
do not commit crimes, and are not in any way compelled to do anything of the kind. This 
suggests that if  and when these conditions do yield an excuse, there must be something 
about these conditions in each case that serves this function, not the mere presence of the 
conditions themselves.*^’
E. American Law Institute
The case o f Brawner v. United States^' marked the end of Durham and the point at 
which the American Law Institute (ALI) test became dominant in American Law.*”’ The
Bazelon, 49; Fingarette. 31-34, 173-174.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Reznek, 200-204; Moore, 600-601.
Robinson, 289-290.
Brawner v. U.S. 471 F. 2d 969 (D .C . Cir. 1972).
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ALI test for criminal insanity, which is the most prominent test used today, says the 
following:
( 1 ). A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if  at the time of such 
conduct as a result o f disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to 
appreciate the criminality o f his conduct or to conform his conduct to the 
requirements o f law.
(2). As used in this Article, the terms “mental disease or defect” do not include an 
abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial 
conduct.̂ "̂
The most prominent feature o f the ALI test was its inclusiveness, meaning that it, in 
some sense, adopted many o f the ideas o f the previous M  'Naghten and Post-A/ 'Naghten 
tests. Thus, it is easy to see why ALI is commonly interpreted as a fusion of M ’Naghten 
and the Irresistible Impulse Rule." '̂ However, there are two important qualifications to 
this fusion. Whereas the Irresistible Impulse Rule refers to “lacking the power to choose 
between the right and wrong,” ALI changes the wording to include “lacking a substantial 
capacity ... Thus, contrary to the Irresistible Impulse Test, ALI is interpreted as 
acknowledging that a lack of control can be chronic in the defendant’s life, as well as that 
the substantial capacity can be partial, opposed to a total.
The second difference is a change from “know” to “appreciate.” In the M  'Naghten 
test, the requirement was that the defendant not “know the nature and quality of the act or
Bazelon, 50.
94 ALI, M odel Pena! Code, Proposed official Draft, Sec. 4.01 (1962).
Goldstein, 87. This fusion is one which em ploys both a mental disease concept, and a functional test 
for “wrongness” (or criminality), both o f  which have their origins in M'Naghien. Similarly, ALI employs 
the “capacity” language, which is a concept used to determine the defendant's ability to control his or her 
actions with respect to the criminal act in question.
96 Slovenko. 24,
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that it was wrong.”'̂  ̂ The ALI test, however, required something other than that the 
defendant have a merely cognitive awareness of the criminality of his action. Here, the 
idea o f emotional appreciation, as opposed to merely prepositional understanding, was 
relevant, which can be seen as an attempt to capture our intuitive understanding of the 
paradigm cases o f criminal insanity.'^* In other words, in order to subsume those cases in 
which it is obvious that a defendant is criminally insane under a criminal insanity test, the 
courts needed to employ a noncognitive concept, such as “appreciate.”
Given the narrowness and/or ambiguity o f the M  'Naghten, Irresistible Impulse, and 
Durham tests, it is easy to appreciate that the move toward the ALI Test was viewed as a 
positive step. This is due to the fact that the ALI test either contains concepts that one of 
previous tests may omit (a volitional prong), or that it embodies a better understanding of 
the mental states that are required for a defendant to be culpable, viz., an appreciation of 
the criminality o f the act. However, while these changes certainly seem to be 
improvements upon past tests, there were still problems that critics have raised.
In addition to all o f the aforementioned problems that beset hoih M ’Naghten and 
Durham which concern the interpretation of the term “mental disease,” ALI was also 
subject to the problem that the plirase “substantial incapacity” is ambiguous, because it 
fails to address the causal connection that the incapacity has with the exculpating 
c o n d i t i o n . I n  other words, it was possible that the specific incapacity o f the defendants 
may or may not be linked to the criminal act. ALI needs the further premise that the 
substantial incapacity is causally responsible for the criminal behavior. Or as one legal
Goldstein, 87.
Fingarette, 146-148; Goldstein, 49-50.
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scholar points out, “[the capacity to appreciate the criminality] ... only requires that the 
mental disease cause a particular mental condition, not that it cause a particular excusing 
condition in relation to the conduct constituting the offense.” '
Another problem with ALI concerns the use o f the term “criminality.” Here, it 
appears that lacking a substantial capacity to appreciate the crim in a ls  o f one’s actions 
was overly restrictive. In a similar way that wrongfulness (understood as legally wrong) 
was criticized for being too restrictive in the M  'Naghten Rule, the same criticism held for 
ALI.'”' In this narrow sense, it is only required that the defendant appreciate the 
criminality o f his or her conduct, and not necessarily the morality’ o f the conduct, which 
is a condition that even in the “paradigm cases” the defendant will usually satisfy.'”" For 
instance, regarding M ’Naghten, it is quite clear that he knew that his actions were wrong 
in the sense that his attempting to kill the Prime Minister o f England was against the law. 
However, he clearly did not believe that this was morally wrong. Rather, M ’Naghten 
believed was that his action was that o f self-defense.
Finally, there was the distinct interpretational difficulty that was associated with the 
meaning of the term “appreciate.” “Appreciate” can be interpreted in two ways, in terms 
o f likelihood and in terms of degree. With regard to the former, it could be the case 
that the defendant “isn’t sure” that the actions were wrong, and that there was only a risk 
that a harm may result. Thus, on this way of framing the rule, to appreciate the 
wrongfulness o f one’s actions was to acknowledge that it could be wrong. For the latter.
Robinson, 299.
Ibid.
Ibid.. 295-296. 
Ibid.
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it could be the case that while the action was wrong, the agent did not appreciate the 
gravity o f his actions, or that while he appreciated that the action was wrong, he didn’t 
know it “as wrong.” '^
The next section will explain the perspectives of two scholars, Herbert Fingarette and 
Lawrie Reznek, concerning the controversial role that the “legal/moral,“ 
“cognitive/noncognitive,” “mental disease,” and “volitional” elements should play in 
criminal insanity jurisprudence, as well as the issue o f whether or not the concept of 
“rationality” should be included in insanity tests. This discussion will be carried out from 
the specific five-part framework proposed in this p a p e r . I n  other words, the works of 
these two philosophers will be explained in terms of the unique responses that they have 
to the various interpretational, empirical, and logical issues that have been associated 
with the use o f these concepts in criminal insanity jurisprudence.
III. Two Approaches to the Central Issues of Criminal Insanity 
A. Herbert Fingarette
1. Preliminary summary. Herbert Fingarette proposes revisions to all of the past 
and current insanity tests. Fingarette holds that M'Naghten, Irresistible Impulse,
Durham, and ALI, should be amended in some form or another. There are a number of 
things that Fingarette finds objectionable in current criminal insanity doctrine!s) which 
are similar to the difficulties discussed in Sections 1 and 11 above. Summarized briefly, 
Fingarette holds, first, that the language of “understands” and “knows” that is contained
10?’ Ibid.. 297.
Ibid.
105 See see. I and II, 1-25 above.
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in the M'Naghten Rule, is problem atic/’̂  This is partly because M'Naghten mistakenly 
leaves open the possibility for an exclusively cognitive interpretation of the defendant’s 
mental states, and partly because these concepts are misplaced in the first p la c e / ’ In this 
latter sense, Fingarette argues that the concepts o f “understands” and “knows" are neither 
necessary nor sufficient for the meaning o f criminal insanity as it is used in a court of 
la w /^  Instead, his account is both cognitivist and noncognitivist in nature and employs a 
different approach and different set o f concepts than M ’Naghten in order to correct what 
he believes is its overly narrow ru le /^
A second aspect o f the traditional insanity tests that Fingarette finds objectionable and 
to which he gives an alternative, concerns the inclusion o f a mental disease prong 
(contained in the tests o f M'Naghten, ALI, and Durham)}^^ Fingarette believes that the 
mental disease prong (especially in Durham) needs revision, because a test which 
employs this concept runs the risk o f incorrectly putting the psychologist in the role of 
ethical expert." ' Fie also argues that Û\e M'Naghten and Durham tests are problematic 
on account o f the difficult nature o f the concept o f mental disease, understood in a
'“’ Fingarette. 148-149.
Ibid.. 146-148.
Ibid., 177 ,2 1 1 .
Herbert Fingarette and Ann Fingarette Hasse, Mental Disabilities and Criminal Rcsponsibiljty 
(Berkeley; University o f  California Press. 1979) 237; Fingarette, 146-150. 27.
Fingarette.. 127-128. 173-174. 
Ibid.. 3 1 ,4 5 -5 2 . 173-174. 247.
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m edical sense. Fingarette addresses these issues by arguing that, for the purposes o f  
the insanity defense, m ental disease is a social, not a medical, concept."^
Third, Fingarette’s account also focuses on certain problem atic conceptual or logical 
features o f  M 'N aghten, ALI, Irresistible Impulse, and D urham . H e  argues that a 
volitional prong should not be included in insanity tests due, primarily, to the fact that a 
volitional prong “does not bring out what is central in our concept o f  insanity.*’’
Instead, he believes that the notion o f  “irrationality” successfully captures the necessary 
and sufficient conditions o f  criminal insanity. Fingarette similarly argues that this is the 
case w ith M ’Naghten  and A L I’s em ploym ent o f the moral concept o f  “wrongness.” ’ 
“W rongness” is considered by Fingarette to be irrelevant to the determination o f  criminal 
insanity in the courtroom . Instead, according to Fingarette, “wrongness,” “volition,” 
“m ental disease,” in the past and present insanity tests should be replaced by Fingarette’s 
distinctive notion o f  “irrationality” insofar as it relates to the criminality o f  the 
defendant’s conduct.” ^
2. Detailed Discussion. Fingarette argues for a general definition o f criminal insanity 
that has three conceptual elements: “(a) irrational conduct, (b) from grave defect in the 
p e rson ’s capacity for rational conduct, and (c) w hich is at least for the time an inherent 
part o f  the person ’s m ental m akeup.” ’”  ̂ The specific version o f criminal insanity that he
Ibid., 2 2 -2 5 . 37. S ee  gen erally , 19-52 .
Ib id ., 3 7 -5 2 .
114 Ibid., 1 2 3 -1 2 5 , 152, 1 5 6 -1 5 9 .
” ■ Ibid.. 71.
"'̂ ‘ Ibid .. 154 -156 . 
Ib id ., 2 1 1 .
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argues for is: “The indiv idual’s m ental m akeup at the tim e o f  the offending act was such 
that, w ith respect to the crim inality o f  his conduct, he substantially lacked capacity to act 
rationally  (to respond relevantly to relevance so far as crim inality is concerned).” ' 
Fingarette explains and illustrates the central notion o f  “responding relevantly to 
relevance” by a series o f  thought experim ents. ' Jones,  who is walking in a park one 
day, decides to throw  a rock into some bushes. Jones does this in a m anner that is 
unaw are, i.e., he isn ’t really thinking about throwing the rock. Fingarette asks us what 
our intuitions tell us about the rationality o f  Jones? He tells us that there is a sense that 
Jones is acting non-rationally, but not irrationality.‘‘ ‘ Fingarette then poses the question: 
W hat is it that we are denying by  saying that Jones’ conduct is not irrational?
U ltim ately, we are denying that “there is som ething crazy, bizarre, odd, or insane” about 
Jones. The issue, then, for Fingarette becom es trying to find the correct ascription o f 
irrationality w hich is “distinctive in insanity.”
In order to  find this ascription, Fingarette then asks us to consider a variation on this 
thought experiment.'-'* Everything is the same as the first exam ple, except that when 
Jones is about to throw  the rock into the bushes, he sees a person. Smith, m oving about. 
Then, because he notices Sm ith in the bushes, Jones chooses to throw the rock in another 
direction. W hat has happened? Basically, Jones has altered his actions based on a
I I X Fingarette, 2 0 3 .
Ibid ., 2 1 1 .
Ibid .. 185 -191 . 
' = ' Ibid., 185. 
Ibid., 186. 
Ibid ., 185.
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relevant piece o f data that entered the picture, viz.. Smith’s presence. And moreover, this 
relevant piece of data confers on Jones a basic moral responsibility, something to the 
effect of, “don’t harm someone unnecessarily.” In this case, Jones behaves rationally, 
because he responds in the right way to “essential relevance.” ' T h i s  begins to capture 
the sense o f rationality that is pertinent to criminal responsibility and criminal insanity, 
according to Fingarette.
Fingarette next considers another variation:'"^ Jones, in the situation with Smith in the 
bushes, decides to throw the rock anyway, quite aware o f the consequences, but not 
caring. Perhaps Jones is in a bad mood. In this case, Fingarette tells us that it would be 
natural to describe Jones’ behavior as rational and malicious.'*^
Finally, Fingarette asks us to conceive of another variation in order to help us 
understand the notion o f irrationality that is relevant to criminal insanity.'"^ Suppose that 
Jones believes “that he is being pursued and persecuted, and is the object of systematic 
attempts at assassination. He sees Smith appear in the bushes. He instantly and violently 
throws the rock at him.” What do we conclude about Jones with respect to the rationality 
o f his actions? First, we believe that the action is clearly irrational in the sense that he 
fails to respond in the right way to a something that, according to our norms, he should 
respond to. Second, as Fingarette argues, “the fanatic character of his belief [that he is 
being pursued and persecuted, and is the object o f systematic attempts at assassination] in 
the face o f everything, leads us to conclude that, in this connection, he is incapable o f
Ibid.
Ibid., 1K6-187.
'-" ib id .. 187.
Ibid.
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rationality, not merely a dedicated or stubborn man who is in error." This describes a
situation in which the person cannot respond relevantly to essential relevance,'"^ or, as
Fingarette states it elsewhere, this is a situation in which the action simply is not
intelligible in terms o f the relevant norms of our society.'^®
Fingarette’s account focuses on what Lawrie Reznek calls "‘substantive rationality."''^^
According to Reznek, substantive rationality is to be distinguished from formal
rationality, in that substantive rationality is understood relative to some value or belief
that the agent ought to have, whereas formal rationality is understood relative to some
value or belief that he actually has.’’* Thus, “someone is substantively rational if he not
only chooses the best means to his ends, but also if his ends or desires themselves are
rational."'”  The reason that Fingarette’s analysis is substantive, according to Reznek, is
that, in his hypothetical cases, it is the normative judgment about what Jones ought to
believe or value regarding Smith’s presence in the bushes, that leads to the judgment that
Jones’ behavior was rational or irrational. The following passage from Fingarette
expresses what Reznek is talking about:
Let it be reemphasized at once: to be able to act rationally with respect to the 
criminality of one’s conduct is not the same as to obey the law or even to respect it. 
It is simply to be able to rationally take into account the implications of the act 
relevant to criminality ... If all rational persons always obeyed the law, it would be 
pointless to have courts and punishments. On the other hand if no person had the 
capacity for rationality, it would be pointless to appeal to law. The criminal may
Ibid., 190.
Ibid.. 190-191.
Ibid., 192. 
Reznek, 177. 
Ibid.
’ Ibid.
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be stupid, immoral, greedy, ruthless, imprudent, or impulsive ... But none of this 
implies that he has lost his reason in these matters, indeed quite the contrary. For if 
we do judge that he has lost his reason, we no longer think it appropriate to 
characterize him as being imprudent, unwise, or immoral. The opposites of 
“rational” in this context are “irrational,” “senseless,” unintelligible.'^'*
In this passage, we can see the sorts o f normative judgments that Fingarette employs in 
order to determine what should constitute “responding relevantly to essential relevance.” 
These normative judgments are embodied in the adjectives “irrational,” “senseless,” or 
“unintelligible,” and entail the sorts o f judgements that are needed, according to Reznek, 
to determine how actors ought to respond to their circumstances, if they are to be 
considered “sane.” ' "*̂ In the case o f Jones, what justifies the judgment that Jones was 
insane, in Fingarette’s view, is that Jones could not respond to his ideas about being 
persecuted in ways that would have prevented him from throwing the rock at Smith.
How do we knoM\ according to Fingarette, that Jones could not respond to his ideas about 
being persecuted in ways that would have prevented him from throwing the rock at 
Smith? Because Jones’ behavior appears “crazy,” “bizarre,” “odd,” or “insane."’ *̂’ 
Fingarette’s proposed conception o f criminal insanity is different from any of the 
traditional tests described in Section II. Fingarette believes, for example, that instead of 
“knowing,” “appreciating,” or “understanding the nature and quality o f the act or that it 
was wrong,” the central concept that should be used is that of “responding relevantly to 
essential relevance.” Thus, for example, whereas M'Naghten will lead a jury to 
determine insanity on the basis o f the defendant’s knowledge (or lack thereof) of the
Ibid., 211.
Fingarette., 177, 185, 211; Fingarette and Hasse, 237.
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nature and quality o f the act or that it was wrong, Fingarette’s test will lead a jury to 
focus on the defendant’s capacity to respond in ways that are considered appropriate (i.e., 
respond relevantly) to those aspects in the defendant’s life that criminally insane persons 
should respond to (i.e., essential relevance).'^’ Perhaps these relevant responses to those 
aspects o f the defendant’s life that criminally insane persons should respond to, involve 
such things, as the defendant’s emotional reactions to his mother, his beliefs about his 
church, or attitude towards society in general. In a paranoid schizophrenic's case like 
that o f Jones, it appears that Fingarette’s determination, specifically, is that Jones lacked 
a substantial capacity to respond with the proper beliefs and emotional outlook to his fear 
that he was being persecuted.'^*
Ultimately, then, the verdicts that derive from Fingarette’s test can be quite different 
than the verdicts that derive from the traditional tests described in Section 11. Whereas 
with M'Naghten, a defendant is sane, if the defendant knows the nature and quality o f the 
act or that it was wrong, under Fingarette’s test, the defendant may still be insane. This is 
because, although a defendant may know, for instance, that killing the victim would end 
his or her life and would likewise be against the law, the defendant may not be able to 
respond in the appropriate way to certain other aspects o f his or her life that a jury 
considers relevant to the criminality of the defendant’s conduct. Thus, as was said above, 
Jones may not have been able to respond with the proper beliefs and emotions to his fear 
that he was being persecuted, even though he may know that his act would hurt Smith,
Fingarette, 185. For a more in depth discussion o f  R eznek's perspective o f  Fingarette’s view, and for 
an explanation as to precisely why Fingarette’s insanity tests requires these normative judgements 
concerning what is “bizarre” or unintelligible, see sec. ill, B, ii, 42-53 below.
See the discussion below , sec. Ill, B, ii, 44-47; Fingarette, 185-191.
Fingarette, 185-191.
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and would be illegal. Fingarette’s test axid M 'Naghten, then, are, according to Fingarette. 
logically independent o f one another.
As was alluded to, Fingarette reads “the ability to respond relevantly to essential 
relevance” both cognitively and noncogntively.'"^® In this sense, the defendant must have 
both a propositional understanding o f those aspects in his or her life that are relevant to 
criminality, as well as an understanding that comes from the emotions, desires, moods, 
etc. Consider, for example, what Fingarette says o f individuals with “psychopathic 
personalities:”
Individuals with psychopathic personalities may manifest a bizarre insensitivity or 
a purposefully cultivated but now deep-rooted callousness that enables them to 
commit crimes o f peculiarly inhuman or cruel kinds. Could it be said, then, that on 
the whole each lacks capacity for rational conduct in regard to the criminal 
significance of the act because of a gross incapacity for emotional responsiveness? 
... If  the facts do show chronic generalized failure to develop human relationships- 
i.e., a generalized incapacity to respond with feelings to the sufferings, agonies or 
death o f human beings—then we do indeed have grounds to view the individual as 
criminally irrational.
Thus, we can see that the approach that Fingarette proposes to explain the way in which 
his test should be understood, will include noncognitive capacities. These capacities may 
involve the ability to feel the “suffering or agonies o f human beings,” or the extent to 
which a person may be ""calloused.'" Accordingly, these noncognitive capacities may be 
deeply relevant, in fact essential, for Fingarette, for properly evaluating the mental status 
of the psychopathic defendant.
Finally, Fingarette’s account is distinctive in at least the following two additional 
senses. First, it makes no mention o f volition, as do the Irresistible Impulse Test and
Ibid., 138. 149-150. 176-177.
140 Fingarette and Hasse, 237; Fingarette, 27. 146-150.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
30
ALI, and indeed Fingarette does not believe that a volitional prong has any use in the 
c o u r t r o o m .T h is  is because, as we shall see,’“̂  ̂a volitional prong does not cohere with 
Fingarette’s overall methodology for determining insanity, a methodology which relies 
heavily on common sense intuition and everyday la n g u a g e .S e c o n d , the particular 
feature(s) o f the defendant’s behavior that is under consideration relates to the criminality- 
o f  his or her actions, not the m o ra lity ,w h ic h  likewise, is a feature that Fingarette 
argues is required by common sense moral intuition and everyday language. In this 
sense, as well as with the noncognitivist reading of the rule,*^^ Fingarette’s analysis 
employs an element that is contained in ALI. In ALI, the use o f criminality is explicit, 
while the language o f “substantially appreciates” is thought to connote noncognitive
147concepts.
With the exception o f  the “mental disease” prong o f the insanity tests, which will be 
discussed in the last part o f this section, these are the basic features o f Fingarette’s 
position. But, while it should be clear what Fingarette’s approach is, it has yet to be 
determined why. Why does Fingarette believe that criminal insanity means something
Fingarette and Hasse, 237.
Fingarette. 69-84, 158-159, 166-168.
See 35-37  below.
'^F ingarette, 138, 140-141, 149-150, 155-156, 165-166, 170, 174-179.
Ibid., 211.
See sec. I ll, A, ii, 31-35 below .
O bviously, Fingarette’s test for criminal insanity is different than ALL I am simply making the point 
that there are tw o senses in which Fingarette’s account is similar. These are, that both tests make use o f  the 
idea that it is the defendant’s understanding o f  the criminality o f  his or her actions that is relevant, and 
similarly, that this understanding is construed in both a cognitive and noncognitive sense.
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Other than v̂ hdiX M  'Naghten or ALI says, and why does Fingarette conclude that criminal 
irrationality understood as he proposes is the best characterization o f criminal insanity?
Fingarette answers these two difficult questions with at least two types o f arguments.
The first is an argument from common sense intuition that often makes use o f the
“paradigm cases o f criminal insanity.” '"*̂  The second type o f argument, is a variation on
an argument from eveiyday l a n g u a g e Fingarette attempts to show in this second
argument, that the everyday language contained in the current insanity tests, e.g. “loss o f
control” and “knowing that an the act was wrong,” are really idioms that express the kind
o f criminal irrationality to which Fingarette is r e fe r r in g .F in g a re tte  says, in effect, that
the meaning o f the key terms contained in the tests o f M ’Naghten, ALI, and the
Irresistible Impulse, is “nothing but” the meaning embodied in the phrase “responding
relevantly to essential relevance,” or one of its cognates.'^'
Fingarette argues that the case involving “Fish,” one o f the most prolific serial
murderers that the world has ever known, is a paradigm case of insanity. Moreover, he
argues that the traditional tests for criminal insanity do not insure that the correct verdict
o f NGBI is rendered:
Fish, the complacently habitual child killer and child eater, was found sane under a 
traditional insanity test, but he was in fact the paradigm of insanity. His emotional 
reactions and desires were in some respects so distorted that he had not the capacity
See, for example. 174-175 where Fingarette says that an analysis o f  insanity “should coincide with 
our intuitive understanding o f  the term." and that “the paradigm cases o f  criminal insanity are discriminated 
readily" is a necessary feature o f  Fingarette’s “m odel.” Prominent examples o f  these so-called paradigm 
cases can be found on 138, 140-141, 149-150, 155-156, 175-179.
See, for exam ple, 174 where Fingarette says that a mark o f  his intuitive account o f  criminal insanity 
is that it will reflect “that com m on language characterizing insanity should be incorporated into or be 
clearly congruent with the account proposed." Examples o f  this kind o f  argument can be found on 165- 
166, 170, 175-179.
'-"Ibid., 175-179.
Ibid.
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to act rationally insofar as these came into play. However, his intellectual and 
perceptual capacities were not ever substantially impaired, nor was he, apparently, 
dominated by depressed or manic moods. When he ate children or stuck sharp 
objects into his body, he knew what he was doing was contrary to law and public 
morality ...Under M'Naghten, Davis, or the Model Penal Code formula. Fish was 
sane ...Yet we do not strain language at all, indeed it is exactly apt, to say that his 
conduct was grossly irrational. And it is this notion that is the ground of our 
intuitive, but very clear, perception that he is insane.’' '
Here, Fingarette argues that an observation o f the distorted and/or bizarre nature o f Fish’s 
actions, his sticking sharp objects in his body and his cannibalism of children, reveals that 
Fish is criminally irrational. Moreover, this criminal irrationality is not captured by 
traditional tests. Essentially, Fingarette argues that one can reasonably assert that Fish 
“knew that his actions were wrong,” that he “had the capacity to appreciate the 
criminality of his actions,” and similarly, that he may not have had a “mental disease” 
from a medical standpoint. However, according to Fingarette, Fish should be found 
NGBI because he was acting in a “grossly irrational” manner.
Another argument where our intuitions are alleged to contradict a so-called paradigm 
case o f insanity comes from the famous case o f Hadfield v. United States. Hadfield 
was a soldier who acted under the delusion that he was “destined to save mankind if he 
became a martyr” when he attempted to kill King George III. In this case, Hadfield knew 
that what he did was specifically and explicitly contrary to the law. Thus, Hadfield did 
know that the action was wrong in a legal sense, and thus he was able to “appreciate the 
criminality o f his conduct.” However, Hadfield was found not guilty, because he
Ibid.. 177.
H adfieid’s Case, 27 Howell 1281 (1800).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
33
suffered from severe delusions that God was commanding him to be a martyr. He was, in 
his own mind, “trying to save mankind.” ’
Fingarette argues that the Hadfield case demonstrates that, on a reasonable 
interpretation of M ’Naghten and ALI, these tests run the risk of directing the jury to reach 
the wrong verdict. In other words, a jury may be led to incorrectly determine that 
Hadfield was sane and guilty, due to the fact that he either “understood the wrongness o f 
his actions,” or that he “appreciated the criminality of his conduct.
Yet another example that Fingarette uses to demonstrate his case, concerns a 
defendant who is eerily reminiscent o f Andrea Yates. This case involves a mother 
suffering from post-partum psychosis, and who upon having her first child, had severe 
symptoms o f hallucination, delusion, and psychotic behavior.’ *’̂  As it turns out, with 
regard to this first child, the mother suffered from destructive infanticidal thoughts, but 
_she never acted on them, “and after weeks she had recovered, after experiencing a 
delusional ecstasy o f rebirth herself.” 'H o w e v e r ,  four years later, eight weeks after the 
birth o f her second child, the woman strangled that new baby.'"'® W hat’s interesting, is 
that in between the two episodes, she led a normal life and carried on quite well, but 
during the second episode, post-partum psychosis quickly took effect, and she killed the 
child. Fingarette, argues that in many respects this woman was rational, and on a 
reasonable interpretation, the woman purposefully, voluntarily, and knowingly strangled
Ibid.
Fingarette, 138, 149-150, 176-177. 
""Ibid.. 140-141.
Ibid., 140.
Ibid.
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the c h i l d . B u t  again, Fingarette argues that by following M Wag/z/e» or ALI, the 
woman may be incorrectly found criminally sane, due to the fact that she “knew that what 
she was doing was wrong,” or similarly, that she “appreciated the criminality o f her 
actions.” '
These examples are designed to demonstrate that ntiihQT M ’Naghten nor ALI 
embodies our common sense intuition about criminal insanity.'^’ These examples also 
are designed to show that the addition of a noncognitivist reading of the criminal insanity 
test is to be preferred to a purely cognitivist one, or, in other words, that an evaluation of 
the emotions, desires, wants, likes, and dislikes o f the defendant is necessary for a proper 
determination of insanity.'^" Thus, while it may be reasonable to suppose that Hadfield, 
Fish, and the psychotic mother were able to respond relevantly to essential relevance in a 
simple propositional sense, it is not the case that these actors had the requisite emotional 
ability to respond relevantly to essential relevance. This, according to Fingarette, is at 
least partly what renders it clear that the actors cannot be sane.'^^
Fingarette's second type of argument, an argument from everyday language, claims 
that, contrary to how they might appear, the common sense idioms that we use to 
describe a case like Hadfield or the psychotic mother, really mean something about the 
irrationality o f the actor. Here, in a long but informative passage, Fingarette expresses 
this view quite clearly;
Ibid., 176.
Ibid., 139-141.
Ibid., 137.
Ibid., 139-141, 148.
163 Fingarette, 177; Fingarette and Fiasse, 237.
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We say of a person who is insane that he is irrational. When he manifests his 
insanity in his conduct, it is natural to speak of his conduct as irrational ... 
Hadfield was a man who wished to be put to death, as a scandal to his society, in 
order to play his God-Ordained role as the new Christ .. .The psychotic mother, 
agonizingly depressed, feeling that the world was filled with suffering and sin, 
tortured by the conviction that her child faced a life o f nothing but suffering and 
sin, skillfully arranged matters so that she could undisturbingly put her infant to a 
relatively quick and painless death ... Her act was irrational ... Her conduct, 
however, was self-initiated, voluntary, skillfully carried out toward the clearly 
conceived end she had in mind ...One could say, idiomatically, that the mother 
was in the grip o f an irrational mood and that she could not help what she was 
doing. One could say o f Hadfield that he did not really understand his act .. .Then 
we might elaborate and go on to say that the mother could not help what she was 
doing because she was irrational, and that Hadfield did not really know what he 
was doing because he was irrational ... However, [the phrase] ‘she could not 
control herself is an idiom stressing that the irrationality shows itself most 
dramatically in the motive ... [and the phrase] ‘he doesn’t truly understand his 
action’ is an idiom stressing that irrationality is most apparent in connection with 
his beliefs and attitudes.'^
As these examples express, the most clear and obvious case where Fingarette focuses
on the everyday language arguments, is the so-called “loss o f control idioms.” '
Namely, Fingarette argues that when the meaning o f “loss o f control” is analyzed
properly, we will find that it does not mean things like “being overwhelmed by emotion”
or “losing one's free agency,” but rather, typically means something else: “Thus, when
we say idiomatically ... ‘he couldn’t control himself,’ what we are getting at is that,
although he literally could and did control what he was doing, he was doing something
that was to a significant extent inconsistent with most of his other usual
inclinations ... Elsewhere Fingarette says:
One source of error connected with the metaphors or analogies involved in these 
idioms lies in analogizing desire, mood, or emotion to “forces,” . .. forces that can
'^ Ib id ., pg. 175-177. 
Ibid., 158-172.
166 Ibid., 166.
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be quantitatively too great for the “governing power of the will’ to curb, and which 
therefor destroy the will or drive the person against his will.""^
Thus Fingarette’s fundamental position is that, according to the way we use everyday 
language, the common sense idioms such as “he couldn’t control himself,’’ usually do not 
mean something about the volition of the actor. Instead, they are claims about a persons 
normal actions, habits, or as Fingarette says, “ ... something [that reveals that] to a 
significant extent [the persons actions] are inconsistent with most o f his other usual 
inclinations.’’ Thus, this alleged feature of the loss o f  control idioms, supports 
Fingarette’s model for criminal insanity, because it conforms to the everyday ascriptions 
o f people.
The final element o f Fingarette’s analysis o f criminal insanity concerns the role of 
mental disease. While mental disease is not mentioned in Fingarette’s test for insanity, it 
is worth noting the special meaning that he gives to it in order to understand why it isn’t 
mentioned and thus to properly understand his a c c o u n t . F o r  Fingarette, “mental 
disease” is a social concept, and not a medical one.'^^ Specifically, “mental disease” is 
described as a “cross-dimensional concept.” ’’’ By this, he means that it is a concept that 
must be understood by reference to various norms o f society.” '  Just as the notion of 
“adequate vision” depends on the situation in which one is using the term (e.g., for
Ibid.
See fn. 144 above. 
See generally, 19-52. 
™  Ibid., 23, 37-43.
Ibid., 37-43.
17: Ibid., 39-40.
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getting a drivers license, or for being a jeweler), so too is this the case with mental
disease. In criminal insanity, mental disease must be understood against the backdrop of
the criminal law and its p u r p o s e s . T h i s  purpose concerns the morally correct
determination of moral agency, which is to be justified by the “widely held ethical-legal
notions of our culture:” '
All of this surely suggests, indeed it almost certainly proves, that the concepts o f 
insanity and mental disease, as relevant to the criminal law, must have a meaning 
and a rationale that are not tied to any specific causal or physical hypothesis at all. 
The meaning and rationale must be rooted deeply and widely in the ethical-legal 
notions of our culture, in our everyday notions of human nature and human 
relations, rather than a special, esoteric, or technical notion tied to some particular 
causal hypothesis or technical information.'^^
Fingarette thus argues that, for the purposes of the law, the concept of “mental 
disease” gives the necessary and sufficient conditions for criminal i n s a n i t y . H e r e ,  
Fingarette says that the notion o f mental disease “ ... amounts to the idea that the person 
whose mind is such that he lacks the capacity to act rationally cannot be a responsible 
person and hence cannot fairly be held morally responsible.” '^  ̂ In this sense, the 
inclusion o f the “mental disease” component in Fingarette’s test for criminal insanity is 
simply redundant, because the determination of a lack of culpability would already be 
contained in the meaning o f “mental disease.” Thus, for the purposes of the criminal law, 
according to Fingarette, “mental disease” is just another word for “criminal insanity.” '
17. '' ' Ibid., 45.
Ibid., 23
Ibid.
Ibid., 23, 173.
177 Ibid., 23.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
38
In summary of Fingarette’s model for criminal insanity, then, we can see that the most 
important feature o f his account is the notion o f criminal (ir)rationality, or as Fingarette’s 
test says, the “substantial capacity to respond relevantly to essential relevance.” ' T h i s  
central notion is meant to be interpreted in both a cognitive and noncognitive sense, as it 
applies to the criminality o f the defendant’s conduct.'®” In accordance with Fingarette’s 
view, a jury should focus on whether or not the defendant has the requisite “rational 
beliefs” and “rational emotions” with respect to those aspects of the defendant’s 
environment that are relevant to the criminal act, in order to determine whether or not he 
or she can “respond relevantly to essential relevance." In this sense, Fingarette’s account 
is grounded in what Lawrie Reznek calls the notion o f substantive rationality, meaning 
that what justifies Fingarette’s test are judgments about what the defendant ought 
rationally to believe, feel, or value in certain situations.'®'
Implicit in Fingarette’s adoption o f criminal irrationality as the central determiner of 
criminal insanity is his rejection o f the concepts o f volition, mental disease, and 
wrongness, as well as the concepts o f appreciate, know, understand, and nature and 
quality that are contained in M'Naghten and/or ALI.'®" Fingarette argues that these 
concepts should not be included in criminal insanity tests for a variety o f reasons, most 
prominent o f which are: ( 1 ) The inclusion o f these concepts in insanity tests is
Ibid.
See 25-28 above.
Ibid., 29-30. 
Ibid.. 28.
Ibid.. 28-29 , 3 1 -3 5 .3 8 -3 9 .
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contradicted by common sense intuition in certain paradigm cases of i n s a n i t y . (2). 
These concepts fail to allow for the relevant legal-ethical norms of our culture to be 
subsumed under the test(s) that contains them .’®'̂  (3). These concepts fail to conform to 
the everyday ascription’s o f human behavior that are relevant to criminal insanity.'*^
B. Lawrie Reznek
1. Preliminary Summarv. Lawrie Reznek’s test for criminal insanity is certainly 
different from both Fingarette’s, and the tests of M'Naghten, Irresistible Impulse, 
Durham, and ALI. But while there are some significant differences between these 
accounts, there are also some similarities.
Reznek and Fingarette both find certain aspects o f the current criminal insanity tests 
that were discussed in Sections I and II objectionable.'^^ This includes the objection that 
M ’Naghten represents an overly narrow test, in the sense that the language of “knows,” 
and “understands,” does not have sufficient noncognitive connotations.'^^ Or at any rate, 
that even if  “knows” and “understands” do allow for noncognitive interpretations, that 
these terms have often been construed by the courts in an exclusively cognitive sense, 
and as such, are too n a r r o w . T h u s ,  like Fingarette, Reznek holds that his test for 
criminal insanity must include the noncognitive mental states o f the defendant, and not 
merely his or her cognitive states."'*^
Ibid., 31-35.
Ibid., 28-29 , 37-39.
Ibid.. 35-37.
See sec- ITI, A, 1 and 2 o f  this paper for specific citations o f  Fingarette's views. 
Reznek, 153-161.
run Ibid., 153-160.
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A second area in criminal insanity jurisprudence that both Fingarette and Reznek find 
objectionable, is the inclusion o f a mental disease prong found in M ’Naghten, Durham, 
and ALl.'^'^ Both Reznek and Fingarette object to the use of “mental disease” in the 
traditional tests, because both view mental disease as a social concept, as opposed to a 
medical o n e T ' Thus, like Fingarette, Reznek finds M'Naghten, Durham, and ALI in 
error, because these tests run the risk of incorrectly placing the psychologist in the 
fundamental role of ethical expert (particularly Durham). In short, this is because there is 
a strong tendency in the courts to treat mental disease as if it were a technical medical 
concept that requires a special expertise to apprehend, when, according to Fingarette and 
Reznek, mental disease is nothing o f the kind.'^‘
However, while there are significant overlaps between Fingarette and Reznek's views, 
they also differ with respect to many other important aspects o f criminal insanity. While 
Fingarette basically rejects all o f  the central concepts that have traditionally been used in 
the insanity t e s t s , Reznek chooses to retain some o f these concepts. The first concept 
that Reznek retains is that o f volition.’*̂'' Unlike Fingarette, Reznek argues that a 
volitional prong is needed to adequately capture our moral intuitions regarding certain
Ibid.. 160.
Reznek, 200-204 206 . 222.
"" Ibid.
'"-Ibid., 219-222.
See sec. Ill, 1 and 2 above. 
Ibid., 307-310.
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cases o f criminal i n s a n i t y . T h u s ,  Reznek retains this essential understanding which is 
contained in both the Irresistible Impulse test and ALI.'*^*
Another area that Reznek finds acceptable in the traditional tests, but which is rejected 
by Fingarette, concerns the role that a criminality/wrongness prong should play in 
criminal insanity jurisprudence.'’̂  ̂ Whereas Fingarette’s account o f insanity employs the 
concept o f criminality that is contained in ALI, Reznek argues that ALI’s application is 
too narrow, thus running the risk o f producing a guilty verdict when in fact it should yield 
NGBI.’^̂  In this sense, Reznek affirms the “wrongness” concept \n M ’Naghten.
However, whereas M  Naghten requires that a defendant “know” that his or her action was 
wrong, Reznek essentially substitutes the concept of “know” with that of “appreciate,” 
thus synthesizing these two aspects o f ALI and M  Naghten.
The final two senses in which Reznek’s and Fingarette’s accounts differ concern the 
role that criminal irrationality should play in the insanity tests, as well the unique role that 
the concepts of “good” and “evil” should play.“ '̂' Regarding the role o f criminal 
irrationality, Reznek denies that irrationality in Fingarette’s sense is either necessary or 
sufficient for criminal insanity.""' He has at least two basic reasons for this. First, he 
argues that the notion of substantive rationality used by Fingarette depends on a
Ibid., 29-32 , 91-92.
Specifically, Reznek's volitional prong differs from ALI and Irresistible Impulse. See 309. 
Reznek, 309.
Although Reznek does not specifically say this, it follow s from his test. Sec 309.
Ibid., 309.
Reznek. 173-188.
Ibid., 199.
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controversial objective value hierarchy that, when applied to cases, is unreasonable."^'^ 
Second, he argues that there are persuasive counterexamples to using rationality for 
determining criminal insanity."*''^ Thus, according to Reznek, not only does Fingarette’s 
notion o f criminal irrationality depend on controversial values, but it also seems to 
contradict our common sense intuitions.
Second, regarding the concepts o f “good” and “evil,” Reznek argues that a morally 
correct insanity test must include these concepts."®"* For Reznek, in order to have a 
proper understanding o f criminal insanity, it is necessary to include the notion that a 
person can be “transformed from a good character into an evil one,” and that this can 
provide an excuse."®^ This provision, which is interesting because it reverts back to the 
basic concepts that were used in Good-Evil test of 1313,"®  ̂requires that a jury evaluate 
the character o f the defendant in terms o f whether or not he or she is a “good” or “evil” 
before he or she committed the crime.
2. Detailed Discussion. Reznek argues that an adequate test for criminal insanity 
should include four principal components. These are: (1). The noncognitive concept o f 
“appreciate.”"®̂ (2). The moral concept o f “wrongness.”'®̂  (3). The volitional prong of
Ibid., 174-184.
Ibid.
Ibid., 307-309.
Ibid.
See sec. II, A, 5-6 above. However, Reznek prefers to think o f  good an evil in “naturalized” sense, 
as opposed to a Biblical sense. “E vil.” in this sense, is understood in terms o f  a “propensity to harm others 
in the pursuit o f  his own selfish interests.” See Reznek, 13.
Ibid., 309.
2(IS Ibid.
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being “unable to control his actions.”'®*̂ (4). A “good/evil” prong. Reznek's test treats
these components disjunctively. It reads:
Someone is NGBI if  he is suffering from a mental illness at the time of the offence 
such that (I) he was unable to appreciate what he was doing or whether it was 
wrong, or (2) he was unable to control his actions, or (3) he was transformed from 
a good character into an evil one."' '
Since we have been considering Fingarette’s model, which holds that a distinctive
kind o f irrationality is the central determiner for criminal insanity, 1 will first address the
notable omission of irrationality from Reznek's insanity test. I will then proceed to
explain Reznek’s view with respect to the four remaining components o f this paper, those
o f “volition,” “criminality/morality,” “mental disease,” and “cognitive/noncognitive.”
Finally, I will address the unique role that Reznek ascribes to the concepts o f “good/evil.”
The first major criticism that Reznek has o f Fingarette’s account is that his test for
insanity depends on the notion o f substantive rationality,”' a n d  that this notion assumes
an objective''^ value hierarchy that is controversial and extremely difficult to justify
when applied to cases."'"^ This objective value hierarchy is made explicit by Fingarette
when he discusses the “norms” that are to justify his appeal to the concept o f “responding
relevantly to essential relevance:” “These norms are not only norms o f correct inference
or valid argument; they are norms regarding what emotions, or moods, or attitudes, or
desires are in some sense suitable or proper with respect to certain other aspects o f one's
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.. 178-179.
’ Ibid., 178. What is meant by ‘'objective” in this context is, “independent o f  the subjective 
preferences” o f  actors.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
44
situation ... In this sense, Fingarette’s “norms” are treated as objective values 
through which third person observers like jurors can determine that an actor “failed to 
respond relevantly to essential relevance with respect to the criminality of his or her 
conduct.”
In order to see specifically how these objective values that Reznek is talking about are 
exemplified in a paradigm case of insanity, and why Reznek holds that these values are 
needed in the determination o f criminal insanity according to Fingarette’s model, 
consider Fingarette’s test as it applies to M ’N a g h t e n Recall that Daniel M ’Naghten 
was a paranoid schizophrenic who, acting under the apparent delusion that he was being 
persecuted by the Tories, shot Edward Drummond, the man who he incorrectly thought 
was the leader o f the Tories, Robert Peel.“'^ Under Fingarette’s test, in order to 
determine that M ’Naghten was insane when he killed Drummond, a jury would need to 
determine that M ’Naghten lacked a substantial capacity to respond relevantly to essential 
relevance with respect to criminality. However, simply knowing that M ’Naghten lacked 
a substantial capacity to respond relevantly to essential relevance with respect to 
criminality, does not explicitly reveal the sense in which these objective values that 
Reznek is referring to are assumed by Fingarette’s test for criminal insanity. In order to
Ibid., 174-184.
Fingarette, 183.
Reznek does not g ive any exam ples o f  how  these “objective values" are exemplified by Fingarette's 
specific test for insanity, nor does he give any exam ples that demonstrate why these objective values are 
needed within the framework o f  Fingarette's test specifically. Therefore, 1 will attempt to fill in some o f  
these gaps. Hence, these next four paragraph represents my most charitable attempt to demonstrate 
precisely how and why these objective values are required by Fingarette's account. 1 also want to make it 
clear that, although 1 agree with Reznek that Fingarette's account depends on some objective values. 1 do 
not necessarily agree that Fingarette's account must depend on the more specific values that Reznek argues 
it does. See 47-51 below.
217 See sec. II, B, 7-10 above.
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properly understand this, it is necessary to inquire into what the concepts o f “responding 
relevantly” and “essential relevance” mean as they are used in the courtroom.
In accordance with Fingarette’s previous illustration of responding relevantly to 
essential relevance, the basic meaning of this central concept as it relates to 
M ’Naghten’s case can be captured by the following counterfactual. This counterfactual 
implicitly contains the objective values to which Reznek refers: If M ’Naghten were sane, 
he would have been able to respond in that we feel he should (i.e., “respond 
relevantly”) to those things or beliefs in his life that we feel he should respond to, or that 
sane and moral persons do in fact respond to (i.e., “to essential relevance”). Thus, in 
attempting to judge the relative sanity/insanity o f M ’Naghten in accordance with 
Fingarette’s test, it is necessary for the jury pick out which aspects o f M ’Naghten’s life 
should constitute “responding relevantly,” and which aspects should constitute “essential 
relevance” with respect to criminality. These objective values, then, are values 
concerning “where to look,” and “what to look for,” in the defendant's life that are 
relevant to criminality. For instance, it is likely that if a jury were using Fingarette’s test 
to determine the respective sanity/insanity o f M ’Naghten, the jury would have picked out 
M ’Naghten’s irrational belief that Drummond was the leader o f the Tories (responding 
relevantly), insofar as it relates to M ’Naghten’s other belief that the Tories were trying to 
kill him (essential relevance), to determine that he was insane. That is, a jury would look
See sec. Ill, A. ii, 24-29 above o f  the case Jones and Smith case. This, recall, is a case that Fingarette 
uses to explain and illustrate his the central notion o f  “responding relevantly to essential relevance.” The 
present application o f  Fingarctte's test to M ’Naghten parallels that o f  the Jones and Smith case. However, 
in the present application, the specific value terms in Fingarette’s test are made explicit.
See sec. Ill, A, ii, 24-28. This is, in essence, what Fingarette is saying in the Jones and Smith case, 
when Jones does not respond relevantly to Sm ith’s presence in the bushes. That is. Jones lacks substantial 
capacity to behave in ways that we feel his should, with respect to certain other aspects in his life that are 
considered relevant to criminality.
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at M ’Naghten’s beliefs and the way in which these beliefs are related to each other and to 
criminality, to determine that M ’Naghten lacked a substantial capacity to respond 
relevantly to essential relevance. In this sense, the basic objective value that is assumed 
by Fingarette’s test, is that M ’Naghten’s beliefs, and the way in which these beliefs are 
related to each other and to criminality, are sufficient for determining insanity."^
However, just as it is clear under Fingarette’s test, that a jury could reasonably pick 
out M ’Naghten’s irrational beliefs in order to determine his criminal (ir)rationality, it is 
also clear that a jury could pick out other aspects o f M ’Naghten’s life to determine his 
respective culpability."'’ These other aspects, in turn, would assume different objective 
values for determining that M ’Naghten had or lacked a substantial capacity to respond 
relevantly to essential relevance. For instance, hypothetically, a juror, if he or she were 
so inclined, could pick out some strange fact(s) about M ’Naghten’s behavior(s) in order 
to determine that M ’Naghten was criminally irrational. Perhaps a behavior o f 
M ’Naghten’s that a jury might pick out would be that M ’Naghten soiled his pants 
(responding relevantly) when he heard a chickadee sing (essential relevance). Or 
similarly, in a more realistic scenario, a jury might pick out the fact that M’Naghten 
previously had stuck needles in himself (responding relevantly) when a Tory member 
was present (essential relevance).'"" In these cases, a jury may believe that the bizarre
One can, however, break down this basic value judgment into more specific value judgements. For 
instance, there is the more specific value judgm ent that, the aspect o f  M Naghten s life that is sufficient for 
determining insanity is his beliefs, as opposed to his actions, for instance. And there is the more specific  
value judgem ent that, the way the particular beliefs X and Y are related to each other and to criminality are 
sufficient for determining criminal insanity. For Reznek s argument against the latter value judgment, see 
the discussion in sec. Ill, B, ii, 52-57 below.
’’ ’ Fingarette and Hasse, 227; Fingarette. 175-177.
This description is meant to parallel the considerations that Fingarette treats as relevant in his 
description o f  Fish, viz., his sticking needles in him self. See Fingarette. 177.
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nature of these behaviors are p ro o f  that M'Naghten must have been criminally insane 
when he shot Drummond, which is clearly a value judgement. “No sane man would act 
in such unintelligible ways," a juror might reason.
According to Reznek, then, Fingarette’s test requires objective values in order to 
determine what should constitute “responding relevantly” to “essential relevance."''^ 
Fingarette’s test requires, in other words, that a jury look at the right aspects o f  the 
defendant’s life in order to determine the respective sanity/insanity o f the defendant, and 
that a jury correctly determine the way that these aspects are related to criminality'. 
However, as was alluded to in the above hypothetical scenarios regarding M ’Naghten’s 
bizarre behaviors, and as Reznek argues, it is clear that at least some of these aspects of a 
defendant’s life that a jury may focus on to determine criminal insanity under 
Fingarette’s test, and thus some o f the objective values that are implicit in this 
determination, are controversial.""^ Particularly, if these aspects o f a defendant’s life, 
concern all or even most o f the defendant’s beliefs, moods, emotions, behaviors, etc. that 
are considered “bizarre,” “strange,” “unintelligible,” or "inappropriate.”
Ultimately Reznek argues that the notion o f responding relevantly to essential 
relevance allows for, and perhaps requires, that a jury determine the sanity/insanity of the 
defendant using whatever norms or objective values they believe are relevant to the 
case.""^ This includes those objective norms that are implicit in the adjectives that 
Fingarette uses to describe cases o f insanity, i.e., “distorted,” unintelligible,” "improper,” 
“inappropriate,” etc. Reznek cites Fingarette’s description of Fish as evidence that the
’ Reznek, 178-179. 
Reznek. 174-184.
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notion o f responding relevantly to essential relevance relies on the controversial values
that are in question; “[Fish’s] emotional reactions and desires were in some respects so
distorted that he had not the capacity to act rationally insofar as these came into play.”‘~̂
Similarly, Reznek argues that these objective values that, as Reznek says, get the notion
o f responding relevantly essential relevance “off the g r o u n d , a r e  visible in
Fingarette’s assessment o f psychopaths (cited previously on page 29):
Individuals with psychopathic personalities may manifest a bizarre insensitivity or 
a purposefully cultivated but now deep-rooted callousness that enables them to 
commit crimes o f peculiarly inhuman or cruel kinds. ... If the facts do show 
chronic generalized failure to develop human relationships-i.e., a generalized 
incapacity to respond with feelings to the sufferings, agonies or death o f human 
beings—then we do indeed have grounds to view the individual as criminally 
irrational.
In cases such as that of Fish and psychopaths in general, Reznek argues that it is the 
values that are entailed by such adjectives as, “insensitive,” “callous,” “improper,” 
“distorted,” and/or “unintelligible,” that Fingarette specifically appeals to as the 
fundamental indicator o f s a n i t y / i n s a n i t y . I n  the case o f psychopaths, the adjectives 
that are used are those o f insensitivity' and callousness as they relate to the psychopath's 
cruel acts. According to Reznek, Fingarette’s use o f such adjectives suggest that any> 
beliefs, emotions, desires, values, and actions that a jury may find relevant to insanity 
may be used in the determination, so long as these aspects of the defendant's life are
Reznek, 1 74-184; see above discussion, 44-47.
--^Fingarette, 177; Reznek, 179-180.
Reznek, 178.
Fingarette and Hasse, 237; Reznek, 176-177.
Reznek, 174-181; See in Fingarette on 177, 185. 2 11 where uses these types o f  adjectives to describe 
criminal insanity, and in Fingarette and Hasse. 237.
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considered as sufficiently contrary to our n o r m s . H e r e  Reznek says, “Fish’s values are 
so flawed that Fingarette concludes that he is irrational and insane ... and Fingarette and 
Hasse argue that psychopaths are ‘not rational in regard to law,’ because they do not 
value human life.”"’'
The ultimate problem that Reznek has with this broad understanding of what should
constitute responding relevantly to essential relevance is that once these values
concerning what beliefs or behaviors are “unsuitable,” “improper,” “distorted,”
“inappropriate,” or “callous” “irrational,” are actually applied to all criminal cases, many
defendants that should be found guilty o f a crime, will in fact be found NGBI." Thus,
although Fingarette’s test works in the paradigm cases of criminal insanity, Reznek
argues that Fingarette’s test is far too easy to satisfy.'"''^ Indeed, according to Reznek,
Fingarette’s test runs the risk o f providing an excuse for all criminals:
When a person breaks the law or a moral rule, it is because he has different values. 
When a person steals, or murders, it is because he does not care sufficiently about 
the suffering he causes. But this does not mean that all criminals should be 
excused. This would make the category of criminal or evil person disappear.
Here Reznek argues that Fingarette’s account could entail that all criminals should not be 
held responsible for their behavior. This is because criminals often have subjective 
beliefs and values that contradict the objective beliefs and values concerning what is and 
what is not “appropriate,” “proper,” “intelligible,” or “rational.” As was mentioned
230 R e z n e k .174-181.
Ibid.. 180.
-'-R ezn ek , 179-180. This includes psychopaths. According to Reznek psychopaths clearly are not 
insane.
2 .3.3 Ibid.
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above,"^^ this defiance o f Fingarette’s objective values concerning what should constitute 
responding relevantly to essential relevance, is exemplified in a criminal defendant’s 
substantial incapacity to respond with the right beliefs, emotions, attitudes, actions, etc., 
(i.e., respond relevantly) to the defendant’s other beliefs, emotions, attitudes, actions, etc., 
(i.e., to essential relevance) that are considered relevant to criminality. Thus, because all 
criminals seem, in some sense, to lack a substantial capacity to respond with the right 
beliefs, emotions, attitudes, actions etc., to those other beliefs, emotions, attitudes, actions 
etc., that are considered relevant to criminality, Reznek argues that all criminals, at least 
theoretically, have an excuse in accordance with Fingarette’s account of “responding 
relevantly to essential relevance."'’^
Consider, for instance, how Fingarette’s test for insanity seems to yield the same 
NGBI verdict in both the Fish case,'^^ and in a case involving the “common criminal.’’
In the Fish case, Fingarette assesses Fish’s mental status by saying that, his “emotional 
reactions and desires were in some respects so distorted” that he could not “respond 
relevantly to essential relevance.” However, if we consider these emotional reactions and 
desires as they apply to the common criminal who clearly is not insane (e.g., a watch 
thief), it can be argued that Fingarette’s test seems to get the same verdict of NGBI, 
which is obviously incorrect. Just as Fish's desires and emotional reactions may be 
“distorted” to such an extent that they may contradict the norms that we believe are 
“proper or suitable,” so too does this seem to be the case with a watch thief. Indeed, a
Ibid.
See sec.. Ill, A, ii, 44-45.
Ibid.
See sec. Ill, A, 32 above.
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watch thief may easily believe that he “deserves” all the watches he can get his hands on 
because society treats him unfairly. Thus, in accordance with Reznek’s critique of 
Fingarette’s view, a jury may find the watch thief NGBI, because the watch thief may 
lack a substantial capacity to have the right beliefs and emotions (respond relevantly) 
with respect to the belief that society treats him unfairly (essential re le v a n c e ) .'T h u s , 
being in the grip o f such a belief, the watch thief continues to steal watches, i.e., he fails 
to respond relevantly to essential relevance.
In short, then, according to Reznek, Fingarette’s notion of “responding relevantly to 
essential relevance” does not distinguish between these cases with respect to their 
differences in culpability.'^^ That is, it does not distinguish a so-called paradigm case of 
insanity like that o f Fish, from a case in which it is equally obvious that the criminal is 
sane. Both may have values that contradict norms that we consider proper. Both may 
have beliefs and emotions that we consider improper with respect to certain aspects o f 
their lives about which we feel they should have different beliefs and emotions. Hence, 
both are not culpable in accordance with Fingarette’s view."'^® But this, Reznek argues, is 
an absurd conclusion. Clearly a test which does not distinguish between a so-called 
paradigm case o f insanity and a case involving the common criminal must be rejected.''^'
Reznek, 179 -]8 1 . 
- ’‘'R eznek , 179-181.
However, I do believe that Fingarette has a response to this criticism. Even though the notion o f  
“responding relevantly to essential relevance” does require certain values for determining what can qualify 
as “responding relevantly” to “essential relevance,” I believe that Fingarette would argue that, as a matter 
o f  fact, jurors will not let just anv  bizarre or inappropriate behavior or belief be used in the insanity test. It 
would only be the extrem ely bizarre behaviors and beliefs that are grounded in common sense intuition and 
everyday language ascriptions as they pertain to moral responsibility. See sec.. Ill, A, ii, 24-39 above.
Reznek, 176-184.
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Reznek’s second argument for the omission o f a rationality prong from criminal 
insanity tests, is quite different. Whereas the first argument is a type o f reductio ad 
absurdem o f Fingarette’s account, the conclusion o f which is that many criminals might 
not be held morally responsible for their criminal behavior, this second type of argument 
rests on a set o f hypothetical cases which are meant to provide counterexamples to 
Fingarette’s view. In particular, these cases are meant to provide counterexamples to two 
o f the senses in which criminal irrationality, or the “ability to respond relevantly to 
essential relevance,’’ may manifest in the defendant- cognitively and noncognitively.""^* 
Thus, in order for a jury to properly determine whether an actor is criminally insane 
under Fingarette’s test, a jury must at least evaluate the actor’s beliefs, attitudes, desires, 
emotions, etc., (i.e., his or her responding relevantly) with respect to those other beliefs, 
attitudes, desires, emotions, etc., (i.e., to essential relevance) that are related to the 
criminality in question.*"*’ This means, in accordance with Fingarette’s view, that the 
jury must focus on at least whether or not the defendant had the requisite “rational 
emotions,’’ or “rational beliefs’’ in order to determine whether or not the actor had the 
capacity to respond relevantly to essential relevance insofar as criminality is concerned. 
Reznek ultimately argues that, when these concepts such as “irrational emotion’’ and 
“irrational be lief’ are examined insofar as they relate to exculpation, Fingarette’s account 
is mistaken, because, in and o f themselves, irrational desires, emotions, and beliefs are 
not relevant to the determination o f criminal insanity.*"*"* This is because there are 
obvious cases, according to Reznek, in which a criminal is irrational, but where our
Ibid., 174-184.
See sec. Ill, A, ii, 31-36 above
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common sense intuitions reveals that the criminal should not have an excuse simply 
based on his or her irrationality alone.
Reznek uses two sorts o f examples to make this case.'"^  ̂ Consider, first, a concept that
Fingarette argues is particularly important in evaluating the Fish case.“'*̂  This is the
concept o f an irrational emotion.^"^^ Because Fingarette does not explicitly discuss what
is meant by an “irrational emotion,” Reznek proposes a way of understanding this
concept. Flis proposal relies on Phillipa Foot’s analysis that, “an emotion is irrational if
the belief on which it should be based is either absent or irrational.”"'̂  ̂ With this analysis
in mind, Reznek asks us to consider a pair o f examples, where irrational fear o f spiders is
considered in relation to criminal responsibility:
When I am frightened by a spider, my emotion is based on the belief that 1 am in 
danger. The emotion is rational if  the spider is a black widow, and irrational if the 
spider is a harmless house spider. But, does this mean that a person fearful of 
house spiders is insane? What if  Gertrude attacks such a person showing her a 
spider? Is she NGBI? If Gertrude believes her life is endangered, she has an 
excuse ... Contrast this with Bob who also has an irrational fear o f spiders, and 
attacks the spiders in his house with cyanide fumes, knowing full well the risk to 
others. Someone is killed. Bob does not have an excuse because he does not suffer 
from exculpatory ignorance ... Irrational emotions per se do not excuse.*'^'’
In these passages, Reznek asks whether our common sense intuitions reject the claim that 
irrational emotions, in and of themselves, should provide an excuse. Thus, Reznek 
argues in the first part o f his example, that Gertrude’s irrational fear of house spiders is
Reznek, 175-179,199
Ibid., 175-176. 180-181.
Fingarette, 175-177.
Ibid.
Reznek, 175.
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not the concept that docs the work in demonstrating her criminal insanity (if she is indeed 
insane) when she “attacks a person showing her a spider.” In order to see why this is the 
case, Reznek contrasts Gertrude’s irrational fear o f spiders with Bob’s. In Bob’s case, he 
too responds to his irrational fear o f spiders by committing some form of possible 
violence against someone else. But, Bob does so by “using cyanide fumes, knowing full 
well the risk to others.” Obviously, Bob is not criminally insane even though his actions 
spring from an irrational fear, and moreover, his actions may appear “bizarre,” 
“senseless,” or “unintelligible.” However, Gertrude very well may have the defense of 
criminal insanity available to her. This is because, while Bob does seem to “appreciate 
his actions and that they are wrong,” Gertrude does not. Reznek argues that these cases 
suggest that irrational emotions do not determine criminal insanity.'^^ This is because 
our intuition tells us in these examples that the culpability o f Bob and Gertrude was 
dependent, not on our knowing whether or not their emotions were based on rational 
beliefs, but rather whether they appreciated the harm they might inflict on others by their 
actions. These examples suggest that Fingarette’s test, a test which does entail that 
irrational emotions, in and o f themselves, can provide an excuse (depending on the extent 
to which they appear “bizarre,” “senseless,” or “unintelligible”), must be mistaken.-^'
Now consider the Gertrude and Bob example as it directly applies to the case of Fish, 
thus allowing us to see just how Reznek’s and Fingarette’s perspectives differ in an actual 
case. Whereas, under Fingarette’s test. Fish is found criminally insane, because Fish's 
emotional reactions and desires were irrational with respect to those beliefs that he may
Ibid., 175-176.
Ibid., 177, 180-183, 199.
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have had that are associated with his cannibalism or his sticking needles in himself,'^' for 
Reznek, if  Fish genuinely is criminally insane, it must be something specific about Fish's 
irrational emotions, viz., that they fail to correspond to the wrongness that is inherent in 
cannibalism and rnurder/^^ Thus, in a similar manner that Bob should not be found 
criminally insane simply because his criminal actions were associated with his irrational 
fear o f spiders, so too is it the case that Fish’s irrational emotions that were associated 
with his camiibalizing children, cannot, in and of itself, be grounds for exculpation. 
Instead, under Reznek's analysis, we would need to know certain other more specific 
facts about Fish’s life that were connected to his irrational e m o t i o n s . W e  would need 
to know, for instance, that Fish’s cannibalization of children was in response to his belief 
that God is commanding him, or something of the sort. In other words, for Reznek, the 
concepts which need to be employed in the judgment o f Fish’s culpability, are the more 
focused concepts o f his ability to “appreciate his actions and that they are wrong,” or as 
we see later see, those that concern volition, good, and evil."*’'’ Whereas, for Fingarette 
the concept that needs to be employed is that o f “responding relevantly to essential 
relevance,” as it pertains to the defendant’s cognitive and noncognitive mental states.
Reznek proposes that a similar analysis applies to the notion of “irrational ends” or 
irrational beliefs."^^’ In the exact same fashion that the concept of irrational emotions is
Ibid.
See sec. II, A, ii. 32. 
-•’ Reznek, 197-199. 
Ibid.
See sec. Ill, B, ii, 59-70.
Ibid., 180-181.
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neither necessary nor sufficient for the legal meaning of criminal insanity, so too is this 
the case with the concept o f irrational ends, thus revealing that whether the irrationality is 
noncognitive or cognitive, the same considerations apply. Reznek offers a 
counterexample to challenge the claim that irrational ends, in and of themselves, can 
provide an e x c u s e . S u p p o s e  that someone’s ultimate end is happiness and he or she 
believed that money will bring them to achieve it. Suppose that it in the process o f 
robbing a bank to satisfy this end, he or she murdered one o f the tellers. Clearly, we 
would not excuse this defendant based on this sort o f irrationality. This is because our 
moral intuitions do not suggest that an irrational end such as, “believing money will bring 
us happiness,” is enough for the negation of moral responsibility. Thus, even if a 
defendant’s end o f “believing money will bring us happiness” (essential relevance) led to 
his or her other belief that he or she should attempt to “control the oil reserves” (respond 
relevantly), which resulted in the defendant "dropping a bomb on the entire state of 
Texas,” (criminality), according to Reznek, these “bizarre” and “crazy" beliefs should not 
yield a NGBI verdict.
In short, then, for Reznek, the concepts that better explain the exculpatory force of 
criminal insanity (than that o f irrationality) are the more traditional concepts of, “the 
inability to appreciate what he was doing or whether it was wrong.”"̂  ̂ According to 
Reznek, a test which employs these respective noncognitive and moral concepts, is much 
more consistent with our common sense moral intuition, and is not susceptible to obvious 
counterexamples, such as those involving Gertrude, Bob, and the person with irrational
Ibid.
Ibid.
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ends.‘ °̂ Moreover, an account such as this is also not subject to the earlier criticism that 
it depends on a highly controversial, and perhaps indefensible, objective value 
h i e r a r c h y . T h i s  is because, for Reznek, the notion o f appreciating what he was doing 
or whether it was wrong, does not depend on the controversial values that are implicit in 
the notion o f responding relevantly to essential relevance. These values, recall, are those 
that are needed to determine both what sorts o f things in the defendant’s life should 
qualify as “responding relevantly” to “essential relevance,” e.g., beliefs, values, actions, 
etc.; and similarly, which specific beliefs, values, actions, etc. should be used in the 
determination o f sanity/insanity. For instance, in the case of Fish, Fingarette seems to 
indicate that Fish’s bizarre behavior, i.e., his sticking needles in himself, and cannibalism 
are sufficient for exculpation."^" Whereas, under the notion o f appreciating what he was 
doing or whether it was wrong, these actions cannot serve to determine that Fish was 
sane/insane. This is because, obviously, the notion of appreciating of what one was 
doing and whether it was wrong pertains to the mental states o f the defendant insofar as 
they relate to his ot her perception of wrongness, as opposed to his physical actions.
Thus, according to Reznek, the considerations o f Fish’s “bizarre behaviors” are the 
wrong considerations to determine insanity, and thus, Fish may in fact not be insane. 
Hence, to the extent that Fingarette’s test does indeed allow a jury to focus on the above
Ibid.. 184-189.
Although the above represents a simplification o f  Reznek’s views, in that this discussion does not 
take into account certain o f  R eznek’s more sophisticated points about what motivates our intuitions that 
ALI is correct, as opposed to irrationality, the above sim plification is sufficient for the purposes o f  this 
paper. For R eznek’s more sophisticated understanding o f  why ALI is a better at capturing our intuitions 
than irrationality, see pgs. 64-74 where Reznek discusses the A s-lf  Rule. Otherwise see pgs. 39-40, 174- 
188.
See 43-50  above.
See sec. Ill, A, ii, 32 above.
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sorts o f broad considerations concerning the “bizarre behavior” of the defendant, and to
the extent that these considerations are misguided insofar as determining criminal
insanity is concerned, then the notion o f appreciating what one was doing and whether it
was wrong depends on less controversial values, than does responding relevantly to
essential relevance does.^^'
A second principal concept that Reznek rejects in criminal insanity jurisprudence, but
this time where Reznek's and Fingarette’s accounts agree, concerns the use o f mental
disease in criminal insanity tests.'^’"* Like Fingarette, Reznek argues that disease (or
mental disease) is a social concept, not a medical one;
It would be attractive to define disease in terms of something objectively 
discoverable.. .But it is a mistake to define disease in terms o f biological 
malfunction. Deciding whether something is a disease depends on whether we are 
better off without it, not on whether our genes are better off without it. The same 
applies to psychiatric conditions.”"̂ ^
More specifically, Reznek argues that the concept o f disease has five distinct features:“^̂
( 1 ). A disease is a process rather than a static defect."^^ (2). A disease does harm."^’̂
(3). A disease is an abnormal process.'* '̂'* (4). A disease is a condition that does not have
See fn. 216.
Reznek. 2 0 4 ,2 1 9 -2 2 2 .
Reznek, pg. 204. 
Ibid., 200-204. 
Ibid., 200-201. 
Ibid., 201-202.
Ibid.. 202.
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an obvious external cause."^” (5). A disease is an involuntary process over which we 
have no control.
While it is beyond the scope o f this paper to get into a comprehensive analysis o f the 
concept o f mental disease, it is sufficient for our purposes to notice the distinctly social 
aspect that Reznek finds in the concept. For instance, consider the features of (2) and (3), 
where the concepts of “hann” and “abnormal” are considered by Reznek as necessary for 
understanding mental disease. The important thing to notice about these concepts, is that 
they are normative in nature, and as such, must be understood in a way that is relative to 
various values o f society. For instance, if  the context in which “harm” is used, were that 
o f “watering one’s flower beds,” then what we might call “harmful” as it relates to the 
watering o f plants, concerns the lack of water that might be given to one’s geraniums.
This is because, obviously, some people like geraniums, and geraniums may die if they 
weren’t watered enough. However, with regards to a different plant, say a dandelion, this 
same lack o f watering may be construed as a good thing, precisely because it causes the 
plant to die, and because we may not like dandelions. Hence, in the same way that a lack 
o f  watering o f one’s plants can be construed as harmful or good, depending on the social 
context in which one is doing the watering, Reznek's analysis o f mental disease reveals 
that the considerations are relevant."^* These social considerations are essentially like 
those that Fingarette mentions in his analysis, i.e., that mental disease must be understood 
against the backdrop o f the criminal law and its purposes.'^ ’
Ibid., 202-203.
Ibid.
212 Ibid., 200-204.
See sec. Ill, A, ii, 36-38.
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Thus, for Reznek a disease is not simply a medical or factual concept like eye color, or 
weight. It is, rather, something that “depends on whether we are better off without it.” 
This social analysis o f mental disease is, as was just alluded to, quite similar to 
Fingarette’s. Fingarette argues that mental disease is a cross-dimensional concept that 
must be understood from the perspective o f the criminal law and its p u r p o s e s . J u s t  as 
does the notion o f “normal vision” depend on the context in which it is being considered, 
so too is this the case with mental disease. Presumably, for Reznek, the above features 
(2) and (3) also make it a cross-dimensional concept. This is because, as was mentioned, 
the notions o f harm and abnormal must be put in a particular context in order for these 
concepts to take on meaning. If this context were that o f the criminal law, then mental 
disease would take on a meaning that would depend, as Fingarette says, on the “widely 
held ethical-legal notions o f our culture” that are relevant to the determination of moral 
responsibility."^’̂
Reznek summarizes his position, which ultimately is directed at the debate over the 
role that the psychologist should serve in the courtroom, with the following: “The 
disease status o f a condition does not determine whether it excuses -  this is determined 
by whether it causes exculpatory ignorance or compulsion. For this reason, changes in 
our disease classification will not influence what we regard as e x c u s e s . H e r e ,  Reznek 
is essentially arguing that because mental disease in the criminal law is not a medical 
concept, the psychologist who classifies psychological phenomenon into medical 
categories such as “psychosis” and “depression,” would not be in any special sense
Ibid.
Ibid.
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qualified to do so with respect to the concept o f “mental disease” as it is used in the 
criminal law. This is because there is no a medical condition known as “mental disease” 
that entails that the person is criminal insane.*’’ Instead, mental disease in a legal sense 
is a concept that depends on society, and what it considers “harmful” or “abnormal,”
Reznek also argues that a volitional prong is needed in criminal insanity 
jurisprudence,"’  ̂and thus that this concept, which is contained in one form or another in 
ALI and the Irresistible Impulse Test, should be preserved.” ’’ The specific version o f the 
volitional prong that Reznek argues for, is that a defendant is criminally insane, if  he or 
she was “unable to control his or her actions.
In order to demonstrate the necessary role that a volitional prong should play in 
criminal insanity jurisprudence, Reznek argues that, contrary to Fingarette’s view, there 
are clear cases o f criminal insanity that jurors subsume under a volitional concept, rather 
then under a cognitive or moral concept."^' Moreover, Reznek argues that as a result of 
these clear examples, we should conclude that losing control is uniquely sufficient for 
exculpation."®"
The first example that Reznek uses to illustrate this, is that o f automatism."®’ The 
legal definition of automatism, which comes from Viscount Kilmuir in Bratty’s Appeal,
Ibid., 222.
Ibid.. 219-222.
Ibid., 74-80, Ch. 5 generally.
270 Although Reznek does not explicitly say this, it can reasonably be inferred from his test. See 309. 
Reznek, 309.
Ibid.. 75. 9 3 ,9 5 -9 6 , 167-168.
Ibid.
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says the following: " I would prefer to explain automatism simply as action without 
any knowledge o f acting, or action with no consciousness o f doing what was being 
done.”"̂ '’ Examples o f automatism, which interestingly, the law has long acknowledged 
as providing exculpation,"^^ are epilepsy, somnambulism (or sleepwalking), concussion, 
hypoglycemia, and multiple personality."^^ In these cases, particularly in a case of a 
epilepsy, a person’s behavior is the involuntary product o f an underlying abnormal 
physical condition, and as such, is clearly not controllable by the agent. Or, in a case like 
sleepwalking, if  there is not an abnormal physical condition which underlies the 
involuntary behavior, the condition is at least known empirically to produce “total 
unconsciousness o f what one is doing.” Indeed, when people sleep, they often do not 
remember their behaviors, e.g., their coughing, talking, sneezing, eating, or dreaming. In 
accordance with these seemingly involuntary behaviors, particularly with a condition like 
epilepsy, Reznek argues that automatism provides obvious examples where a defendant 
should be found to have an inability to control his or her actions.'^^
Another more interesting sort o f case in which Reznek argues that the need for a 
volitional prong can arise in criminal insanity jurisprudence, concerns a case of 
Premenstrual Syndrome (PMS)."^^ Reznek argues “that PMS can dramatically reduce a
’ Ibid.. 93-98.
2 M Paul Fenwick (1990) ‘Autom atism ’, in R. Bluegrass and P. Bowden teds) Principles and Practice o f  
Forensic Psychiatry. London. Churchill Livingstone. 273.
Goldstein, 203; Reznek. 95. 
Reznek. 93-96.
Ibid., 75, 93, 95-96 , 167-168. 
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woman’s capacity to control her impulses,”'*^ and thus that PMS may impair her ability 
to resist what, under normal circumstances, she would normally have no problem 
resisting. For Reznek, the only thing that explains the fact that we feel that a woman has 
a legal excuse when she committed a crime while experiencing PMS, is that she lost 
control.‘ °̂ However, Reznek qualifies this by saying that the woman with PMS should 
take precautions in order to deal with her weakened resistance levels.*^’ Thus, “being 
violent during PMS is much like taking alcohol when you know it will make you 
dangerous.”"̂ * In other words, just because a woman is violent during a PMS phase, 
does not mean she has an excuse. Presumably, in a legitimate case of criminal insanity 
where a woman commits a crime while experiencing PMS, certain other factors would be 
present in the woman’s life. These factors might include that she didn’t know that she 
had PMS, or she didn’t know what triggered the episodes that caused her to be violent 
while she is experiencing PMS, or something of the like. Nonetheless, as Reznek says, 
“there are many cases [such as PMS] where we judge that a person was not in control, 
and should be excused.
However, these examples o f automatism and PMS that Reznek argues should be 
subsumed under a volitional prong, lead to a more complicated discussion of the 
particular volitional prong that Reznek is advocating. As was mentioned in Section II o f 
this paper in association with the discussion o f the Irresistible Impulse Test, the
Ibid,
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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notoriously difficult problem of constructing empirical criteria for determining when this 
loss o f control has occurred often arises here.’ *̂* Thus, although these empirical criteria 
are much easier to construct in a case like that o f epilepsy, the majority of the cases 
where the defendant “loses control,” such as that o f a PMS case, will not admit o f such an 
obvious empirical determination.'^^ Consider, for instance, the difference between 
someone who is suffering from a grand mal seizure, and someone who acts out o f anger 
and “bums her husband’s bed.”'*̂*’ Whereas with the former, there is a well- 
acknowledged abnormal biological process that is responsible for the loss o f control, 
there may not be such an obvious abnormal biological mechanism at work in the latter. 
Thus, if  Reznek’s version of the volitional prong were to be employed in the courts, it 
appears that there may be difficulty in making a determination in accordance with 
empirical principles, even though our intuition may tell us that the person who burned her 
husband’s bed has an excuse.
Reznek is well aware o f this empirical difficulty. His suggestion for dealing with this 
matter, is what he calls, “fixing the standard circumstances that would constitute reasons 
for an actor to do otherwise.”*‘̂  ̂ What this means in the abstract, essentially, is that for 
the practical purposes o f determining when a person has lost control, Reznek holds that 
the courts should, in each particular case, construct a “set o f circumstances” that would 
serve as a reason or set o f  reasons that should under normal circumstances deter the
See sec. II, C, 14 above.
Reznek, 75-92.
Richard J. C elles , and Murray S. Straus. Intimate V iolence. New York; Simon and Schuster 1989,
1 22 .
Reznek. 81-83.
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defendant from doing that which he in fact did, i.e., commit a crime. Then, once these 
reasons are given or circumstances are set, the jury has an empirical standard by which to 
determine whether or not the defendant was able to control his or her actions with respect 
to the crime he committed.'^^
The concrete example that Reznek uses to illustrate the idea of “fixing the standard 
circumstances that would constitute reasons for an actor to do otherwise,” is an example 
o f eating cake." '̂^ Reznek explains that, if  one were to consider eating a piece of cake, we 
might postulate that a sufficient reason for not eating the cake, is that it will produce 
heartburn or something similar. That is, we might “fix the standard reasons that would 
constitute reasons for an actor to do otherwise” to the fact that the cake will cause 
heartburn. But, suppose that one ate the cake anyway. In this situation where the 
“standard circumstances” are set broadly, we can conclude that one is “unable to control 
his or her behavior” (and is, thus, not responsible). On the other hand, Reznek asks us to 
suppose that the cake has cyanide in it. In this situation, the standard circumstances 
would be set more narrowly, so that the presence o f cyanide in the cake would represent a 
sufficient reason not to eat the cake. Clearly, then, if  the person did not resist eating the 
cake even though it had cyanide in it, it is reasonable to think that he or she was unable to 
control his or her actions, according to Reznek.^””
Now consider this notion of “fixing the standard circumstances,” as it relates to a 
hypothetical rendering o f Fish’s urges to cannibalize children.^®' Suppose, for instance.
2 o x Ibid.
Ibid.. 83.
3(10 Ibid.
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that we fix the standard circumstances that would constitute a reason for Fish not to 
cannibalize children, to the following proposition: Fish should be able to resist eating 
children when someone is at his house. Now suppose that Fish ate the calf o f a young 
child when his grandmother was visiting. In accordance with this particular way of 
setting the standard circumstances. Fish could not control his actions. This is because 
Fish was not deterred by the standard circumstances that were set in this particular case 
(and that we deemed should deter him). However, suppose we set the standard 
circumstances more narrowly. In this case, suppose that the standard circumstances that 
should cause Fish to do otherwise, are captured by the proposition that, Fish should be 
able to resist eating children when his mother is home. In this case, just because Fish ate 
the calf o f a young child when his grandmother came to visit, we would have to say that 
Fish was in control o f his actions, and thus morally responsible for his behavior. This is 
because Fish was not deterred by reasons which we deemed he should have been deterred 
by.
So, Reznek suggests that, for the practical purposes o f the court, we set the standard 
circumstances somewhere in order to determine when someone cannot resist a certain 
action.'’̂ " In the cake-eating example, most likely we would set the standard 
circumstance somewhere in between the two examples. Thus, we would not want to fix 
the standard circumstances to “needing to die from eating the cake.” Instead, we would 
need to set the standard circumstances somewhere in the middle, perhaps in a case where
See Fingarctte's discussion o f  Fish in sec. Ill, A. ii, 32. The scenario involving Fish in this paragraph 
is used for purely illustrative purposes.
Reznek, 80-91.
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it is obvious that serious harm might result. But, as Reznek says, this will ultimately 
depend on our moral point o f view.^^^
The final feature o f Reznek’s test for criminal insanity, which can perhaps be thought 
o f as a naturalized version^""* o f the Good-Evil test of 1313/^^ concerns the idea that there 
are cases in which the only concepts that properly explain the fact that a defendant is 
insane, are those o f “good” and "evil.”^^ Thus, Reznek argues that a defendant is 
criminally insane, if  he or she “was transformed from a good character into an evil 
one:”'»'
The notion of an evil character is central to the idea of excuses. Ignorance, 
compulsion, and automatism are all excuses because they are ways in which a good 
person comes to do something bad. We want to punish evil characters, and want 
our excuses to exempt good ones. Hence, these are excuses. The hypothesis is 
tested (and in fact suggested) by cases o f insanity.”'»^
As the above passage indicates, Reznek believes that the concept o f an evil character 
occupies a deep place in our thinking about criminal insanity. Thus, for Reznek, not only 
is the notion of an evil character needed in order to get the right verdict in certain cases, 
but it also represents, in the deepest sense, the most basic of exculpating conditions. 
Reznek says in numerous places, that the volitional, cognitive, and moral concepts that 
are contained in the language being “unable to appreciate what he was doing or whether 
it was wrong,” and being “unable to control his actions,” all serve in the exculpatory role
Ibid., 82.
’"‘'Ib id .. 13.
See sec. II, A. 5 above. 
Ibid., 91.
Ibid., 309.
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that they do, because they reflect that the defendant is not an evil character. As Reznek 
succinctly puts it, “it is the notion of evil character that best explains why we accept the 
excuses that we do."̂ "̂̂
However, while Reznek argues that the notion of an evil character best explains M'hy 
we accept the excuses that we do, he also argues that the notion o f an evil character is 
needed in the courtroom in order to get the just verdict in particular cases. Reznek argues 
that the following type o f scenario illustrates the unique and necessary place that the 
good/evil prong should play in criminal insanity ju risp ru d en ce°  Suppose that a black 
man is taunted by a group o f racists. Suppose that if there were a policeman at his elbow, 
the black man would not retaliate, and thus the “standard circumstances” would prevent 
him from doing so. However, suppose that if there were no police there, then the man 
would retaliate against the racist group. In this situation, if we set the standard 
circumstances broadly, that is, if  we say that to lose control, the black man must attack 
the bullies in the presence o f the cop, then black man will almost always be considered be 
in control o f his actions, and thus be morally responsible.^" This is because, obviously, 
most people in this sort o f a situation would resist such actions. However, if  we set the 
standard circumstances narrowly, that is, if  we say that in order to lose control, the black 
man must attack the bullies if  his friend is around, then often times individuals will “lose
Ibid., 307.
Ibid., 12. 
-'"Ibid.. 91.
Ibid.
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control,” and thus fail to be responsible.'^'^ Reznek argues that both of these results are 
unacceptable. The former is unacceptable, because when the standard circumstances are 
set broadly, the black man will be (incorrectly) found to be in control o f his action, and 
thus guilty of assault. Whereas, with the latter, if  the circumstances are set narrowly, it 
will many times be the case that the defendant will be incorrectly found to have lost 
control, and thus be NGBI. Similarly, Reznek argues that there seems to be no clear 
sense in which the black man “was unable to appreciate what he was doing or whether it 
was wrong.”'’'" To the contrary, in a case like this, the black man probably fully 
appreciated what he is doing, and might even believe that it is right. For Reznek, this 
case is one in which the defendant should have an excuse, and where the only test that 
will consistently capture our understanding of this excuse, is one in which “abnormal 
circumstances induces a temporary change in character.’” '’*
Other examples where Reznek argues that the person has an excuse of this sort, will 
come from those cases in which an individual fails to satisfy the loss of control rule, and 
where the person does not fall under the requirement that he or she is “unable to 
appreciate what he was doing or whether it was wrong.” Reznek argues that the example 
o f a psychotically depressed mother, much like that o f Andrea Yates, who kills her 
children because she believes they are better off dead, fits this profile.’'" Thus, Reznek 
argues that, on a reasonable interpretation, a woman such as this was “able to appreciate 
what she was doing and whether it was wrong,” and moreover, that there were no
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., 92.
- Ibid.. 233.
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circumstances that would justify an appeal to loss o f control. Reznek argues that the only 
way to justify this sort o f case, is through the idea that the woman is a good person, but 
through her illness, was turned into a bad person temporarily.^'^
Finally, consider the category o f defendant that Reznek mentions who is paranoid and 
believes that he or she is being persecuted, and decides to kill in retaliation.^'^ Again, 
cases that are in this category, represent situations in which the person is not out of 
control, and similarly does not satisfy the “appreciation of what he was doing or whether 
it was wrong” prong. But, Reznek argues that “nevertheless, from M ’Naghten onwards,, 
such mentally ill offenders have been seen as paradigmatic cases of insanity.”^ T h u s ,  
Reznek argues, our common sense intuition tells us that, there should be another excuse 
besides those of loss o f control and “an inability to appreciate what one was doing or 
whether it was wrong.” This excuse is that the defendant is “transformed from a good 
character into an evil one.”
In summary, we can see that Reznek both affirms and denies various parts of the 
traditional tests for criminal insanity. Similarly, there are distinct senses in which 
Reznek's account is both compatible and incompatible with that o f Fingarette’s. Where 
Reznek and Fingarette agree about the meaning o f criminal insanity, is, first, in their 
rejection o f  a mental disease prong found in M ’Naghten, Durham, and ALI.''^' This is 
because, contrary to the medical meaning that the courts assign to mental disease, Reznek 
and Fingarette argue that mental disease is a social concept. A second aspect o f the
Ibid.
■ Ibid.  
Ibid.
See 36-38 , 56-59 above.
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traditional tests that both agree about, concerns the rejection of those concepts in 
traditional insanity tests which do not have sufficient noncognitive connotations/"^
These include the central concepts o f “know” and “understand” that are found in 
M'Naghten. Instead, both theorists choose to employ a different set of concepts to 
convey the relevant noncognitive applications as well. In Reznek s case, it is the notion 
o f appreciate that is found in ALI, whereas for Fingarette it is his own unique notion of 
criminal irrationality.^"’
However, as we’ve seen, their accounts differ with respect to a number of other issues. 
The most fundamental difference, concerns certain basic concepts that they believe give 
the necessary and sufficient conditions of criminal insanity. Whereas Fingarette holds 
that criminal irrationality as he defines it provides both the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for criminal insanity, Reznek holds that Fingarette’s notion of criminal 
irrationality is irrelevant to the d e t e r m i n a t i o n .T h i s  is because, first, the notion of 
“responding relevantly to essential relevance” rests on a controversial objective value 
hierarchy that allows far too many criminals to qualify for exculpation, perhaps even all 
criminals. Second, that there are counterexamples to the different senses in which the 
notion o f “criminal irrationality” might be interpreted, i.e., both cognitively and 
noncognitively. Instead, Reznek proposes that we rely on more traditional concepts in 
criminal insanity jurisprudence, than those o f Fingarette’s. These include, a volitional 
prong that is found in the Irresistible Impulse Test and ALL ’" ’ These also include, the
See 28-29 , 46-50  above.
[bid.. 24, 42.
Ibid., 43-56 .
Ibid., 1 1 -1 5 ,4 2 , 59-65.
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concepts o f appreciation and wrongness, which can be found in ALI and M ’Naghten, 
r e spec t ive ly .Fina l ly ,  Reznek holds that a morally correct insanity test must include 
the concepts o f good and evil, which originally were used in the Good-Evil Test of 
1812.-^ '̂“̂ In short, Reznek argues that in certain cases o f criminal insanity, these good and 
evil concepts are the only ones that will allow a jury to reasonably reach a correct 
understanding o f moral responsibility in some cases.
IV Conclusion
The purpose of this paper was to analyze two philosophers’ perspectives on criminal 
insanity, in the hopes o f finding better alternatives than that offered by the state o f Texas 
for dealing with controversial cases such as the one involving Andrea Yates. ’"'’ This 
analysis was carried out from a five-part perspective which involved the role that the 
concepts o f mental disease, volition, rationality, legal/moral, and cognitive/noncognitive 
should play in criminal insanity jurisprudence. In Section II, I attempted, through an 
explication o f the conceptual history of the insanity defense, to reveal some of the 
problems that have characteristically given rise to these five issues. In Section III, I 
attempted to present the revisionist perspectives o f Herbert Fingarette and Lawrie Reznek 
in the context o f this conceptual history. Now, 1 will apply their tests for criminal 
insanity to the Andrea Yates case, which is a fairly easy and straightforward application.
324 Ibid.. 42 , 46-50.
Ibid., 42 , 65-68.
The purpose o f  this paper, however, has not been to evaluate  the theories o f  Fingarette and Reznek. 
This includes an evaluation o f  their view s, both in terms their responses to intcrpretational, logical, and 
empirical difficulties presented in Section 11, and in terms o f  w ho’s model for understanding cnminal 
insanity is “better."
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because both theorists have already tested their views against a case that is much like that 
o f Yates.
As was mentioned earlier in this paper,’"* Fingarette applied his test for insanity to 
the case o f a woman with post-partum depression. This woman might as well have been 
Andrea Yates. Recall that in the case that Fingarette described, like Yates, the woman 
with post-partum depression began to have destructive, infanticidal thoughts after the 
birth o f her first child. However, like Yates, this woman did not act on these psychotic 
thoughts. It wasn’t until after the birth o f her second child that the thoughts “took over,” 
after which time the woman strangled her child.’"̂  In Yates’ case, it was, of course, after 
the birth o f her fifth child that Yates drowned all five o f her children.
Fingarette argued that a defendant such as Yates should have an excuse.” ® However, 
he also argued that, it is reasonable to suppose that a defendant like Yates “purposefully,” 
“voluntarily,” and “knowingly” strangled the child, and thus that M'Naghten^ ALI, and, 
o f course, the narrower Right-Wrong test that Texas uses, would not provide such an 
excuse.” ' In this sense, Yates “knew” or “appreciated” that what she did was contrary to 
the law and wrong. When Yates called her husband and the police, quite cognizant that 
all o f her children were dead, it appeared that Yates “knew and appreciated the nature and 
quality o f the act and that it was against the law and wrong.” It also appeared that Yates 
voluntarily chose to murder her children in the sense that she was well aware o f her
Fingarette. 140-141: Reznek, 233. 
See sec. Ill, A, ii, 33-35, above.
Ibid,
Fingarette, 140-141.
.131 Ibid.
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destructive infanticidal thoughts, and she had ample opportunity to put herself in a 
hospital, or to get some help elsewhere. Moreover, Yates had resisted acting on these 
thoughts after the birth o f earlier children, and so based on these empirical observations, 
it is reasonable to suppose that Yates did not lose control.
However, according to Fingarette’s test, Yates would indeed lack a substantial 
capacity to respond relevantly to essential relevance. This was because, in the language 
that was used earlier,^”  Yates simply did not respond in ways that are considered 
appropriate to those aspects o f her life that a sane and moral person would. She did not, 
for instance, respond with a rational set o f beliefs to the voices that she heard from the 
devil. Her response, to drown her five children in the midst o f these voices, was deeply 
irrational. Her being overcome by post-partum depression to such an extent that she 
could have let her thoughts and emotions “take over," was simply bizarre, horrific, and 
improper in the extreme. Under our norms constituting what sane behavior should look 
like, and how sane people should respond to certain aspects of their life that are relevant 
to criminality, Yates’ behavior was “grossly irrational.” She would be found NGBl in 
accordance with Fingarette’s test.
While reaching the same verdict, Reznek would analyze the Yates case differently 
than would F i n g a r e t t e . W h i l e  Reznek would agree with some of Fingarette’s o f the 
conclusions, he would reach these conclusions for different reasons. Regarding the 
volitional prong, Reznek argued that a psychotically depressed mother such as Yates is
See Intro, above.
' See 24-26 , 43-48  above.
See 67-68 above.
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often an example o f an actor who cannot reasonably be considered to lose control.
That is, in a similar manner as above, Reznek would hold that there are no empirical set 
o f circumstances that would justify the determination that Yates lost control. She knew 
about her psychotic condition for many years, and could have dealt with it professionally. 
She resisted such infanticidal temptations with earlier births. She thought a great deal 
about doing what she did before she did it. She would not satisfy Reznek’s loss of 
control rule.
Reznek would also argue that Yates did in fact appreciate what she was doing and that 
it was w r o n g . T h u s ,  according to this criterion o f Reznek, Yates should be found 
guilty o f first-degree murder. In the same manner as was discussed with Fingarette, it is 
reasonable to suppose that Yates did appreciate what she was doing and that it was 
wrong, in the sense that Yates' execution o f her children seemed calculated (e.g., her 
laying her children in a neat row on the bed). Similarly, as was mentioned, she called 
both her husband and the police to report the case right after the murders, suggesting that 
she appreciated how society would perceive such actions.
For Reznek, the only test that can justify our intuitive sense that Yates should have 
been found criminally insane, is that she was “a good person who temporarily became 
evil.”-̂ ’’ Indeed, Yates does seem to fit this profile. Often times she was a good mother 
and wife. Yates was a valedictorian o f her graduating class. She had many friends. She 
was likeable. She seemed, in general, to be “a well-meaning person." But. under the grip
Ibid.
Ibid.
" Ibid.
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o f mental illness, Reznek argues that good people can temporarily become evil. Clearly, 
Yates would fit this profile, and should be found NGBL
Though not immune from criticism, the revisionist perspectives of Reznek and 
Fingarette get the right verdict in the Yates case. Therefore, they provide, in this case, a 
better alternative to Texas’ test for criminal insanity, which is too narrow. What the 
criminal law needs is a broader, more liberal test for criminal insanity than that o f at least 
Texas’ 2iné M 'Naghten, and most likely ALI as well. This is because, these tests do not 
satisfy our understanding o f a morally correct conception of criminal insanity. Although 
jurors, when deciding cases o f criminal insanity, can always choose to subsume their 
understanding o f moral responsibility under more narrow conceptions than those of 
Reznek and Fingarette, the chances o f them may be reduced. In other words, often the 
specific conception o f criminal insanity does matter. In the case of Andrea Yates, a 
broader test for criminal insanity would most likely result in her being sent to a hospital 
instead of a prison.
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